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The psychological elements
of religious faith



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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS
OF RELIGIOUS FAITH



THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS
OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

LECTURES

BY

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PREFACE

MANY of Dr. Everett's friends have expressed the wish that there should be some permanent record of his lectures on theology — a wish justified, it is believed, by the unique character of the lectures and the profound impression they made on those who heard them. The Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, therefore, with the approval and authorization of the only surviving member of Dr. Everett's immediate family, appointed a committee to consider the feasibility of bringing out the lectures, or a part of them, in book form. As Dr. Everett left no manuscript of his theological lectures, — seems, indeed, never to have written them out, — it was necessary to have recourse to notes taken by students. The task of putting this material into shape was committed to Professor Edward Hale of the Harvard Divinity School, who, on another page, explains his

method of procedure; the present volume is the result of his editorial work.

Dr. Everett divided his theological instruction into two courses. Of these, the shorter course, on the psychological elements of religious faith, was intended by him to serve chiefly as an introduction to the longer course in which he considered the special content of religious faith. It has been judged advisable to issue the first of these courses in a separate volume. It gives the fundamental principles of Dr. Everett's inquiry, and forms a unity in itself. If the reception given to this volume should be encouraging, the lectures of the second course, it is hoped, may be issued in the near future. This second course deals with the great questions of religious belief: the being and attributes of God, human freedom, sin and salvation, immortality, and the organization of religion in human life.

C. H. TOY.

For the Committee.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
June, 1902.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

DR. EVERETT was made Bussey Professor of Theology in the Harvard Divinity School in 1869, and in the following year delivered for the first time the shorter of the two courses of lectures which Dr. Toy has described in the Preface. At first these lectures were entitled, "The Science of Religion"; later the title, "The Psychological Basis of Religious Faith," was substituted, this in turn giving place finally to the title under which the lectures are here reported, "The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith."

During the thirty years from the time when Dr. Everett first delivered these lectures until his death in October, 1900, there was comparatively little change in the substance of the lectures as a whole; but in the arrangement and order of the thought, and in the greater or lesser emphasis given to one or another aspect

of it at different times, as well as in the illustrations used, there was continual change. This variety of treatment gave to the lectures as Dr. Everett delivered them a peculiar freshness and spontaneity, but it has made more difficult the task of reproducing them. There was no manuscript of his own to which reference could be made, and no one set of notes, however full and intelligent, could be relied upon without comparison with others.

It will therefore be readily understood that the lectures as here given can only suggest the substance of Dr. Everett's argument, with something of his method of presentation ; they are necessarily a condensed report rather than a reproduction, with the defects of style incident to such a report, brief and sketchy in comparison with the lectures as Dr. Everett delivered them, and without the finished form which he would have given them if he had himself prepared them for the printer. A word of explanation may not be out of place in regard to certain colloquial phrases which occur ; they are characteristic of Dr. Everett's less formal speech, and belong to a certain playfulness of

thought which was habitual with him even in his more serious moods.

The twelve chapters into which the book is divided represent about thirty lectures, the number in the course varying a little from year to year.

I am indebted to the Rev. F. M. Bennett, the Rev. V. J. Emery, Professor H. H. Horne, the Rev. W. I. Lawrance, Mr. George B. Rogers, Professor J. H. Ropes, Mr. C. G. Ruess, Dr. Duren J. H. Ward, and the Rev. A. H. Winn for the use of their notes, and to Professor Horne and Mr. Ruess for their assistance in verifying references.

EDWARD HALE.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS,

June, 1902.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION : THE METHODS OF THEO- LOGICAL STUDY

IN the study of religion it is necessary to have at the outset a definite and correct understanding as to our starting-point, and the method which we are to follow. In general, we find four different methods of theological study ; they are sometimes followed singly, but more often they are blended.

In the dogmatic method, followed by most of the older theologians, certain facts are assumed. Beginning with the thought of God, the student goes on to consider the divine attributes. Belief is made to rest upon authority. This authority may be external ; thus in Christianity we often find the Bible or the Church made authoritative. Or we may have

an internal authority, the authority of the reason. When the conception of God has been made clear, the consideration of man's relations toward God follows.

The second of the four methods is known as the critical method. It begins with a criticism of dogmatic theology, showing where it fails or overpasses its limits. In its extreme form it ceases to be a method of theological study and becomes simply negative criticism. We see an instance of this in the attitude which some have taken in the consideration of so-called anthropomorphism, the representation of the divinity under the form of man. This anthropomorphic conception of the divinity came as an early form of religion which, in comparison with still earlier forms, marked a real advance in religious thought. Now, in considering this conception, one could follow the critical method up to a certain point and still have positive results. If we only went so far as to show that the divinity cannot have physical organs like man, and that any resemblance between the divinity and man must consequently be only spiritual, the result of our criticism would still be positive;

for we should still have an anthropomorphic conception, in which the divinity would be represented with the spiritual, instead of the physical, attributes of man. When, however, men go farther, and say that human nature cannot in any aspect adequately represent the divine nature, they reason away all spiritual attributes and thus all positive religion.

The dogmatic method tends to become narrow and assumptive. The critical method may destroy the limits of theology and leave nothing. Thus Strauss in "*Die Christliche Dogmatik*" pushes the critical method so far that he leaves little positive religion. On the principle that everything that is not absolute, if allowed to go far, will pass over into its opposite, he takes an assertion in apparent good faith and then carries it by its own development into contradictions. "Give the devil rope enough," we say, "and he will hang himself." It is thus that the critic simply gives rope enough to certain beliefs. To some extent the critical method enters into all theological study in which modern thought has part. It must not be thought wholly negative in its tendency. Working together with the

dogmatic method, it has produced good results.

The third of the four methods, the psychological, is distinctly positive; but it differs fundamentally from the dogmatic method in that it begins with religion, and from it reaches, so far as it can, the thought of God, whereas the dogmatic method begins with the thought of God and passes on from that to reach religion. The psychological method, beginning thus with the thought of religion as it has been actually recognized in the various forms which it has taken, cannot pass outside of religion itself; therefore it can never reach belief in any attribute of the divine nature which is not involved in religion. That is, religion itself, as actually manifested and recognized, furnishes the whole sphere within which theology must move.

Of course this method also, like the critical method, in itself and carried to an extreme, would leave no positive religion. Thus Feuerbach¹ reduced religion to psychological ele-

¹ Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach, 1804-1872, "Das Wesen des Christenthums," "Das Wesen der Religion," etc. See

ments and reached no religious faith whatever. No authority was recognized, and religion became simply man's projection of himself.

When we look for the supreme example of the psychological method, we turn to Schleiermacher.¹ He recognizes nothing which is not bound up in the nature of religion. There is a positive result, the recognition of an absolute reality with which religion brings us into relation. Schleiermacher, however, recognizes no divine attributes as such, but only a method of relation.

The last of the four methods is the speculative. It occupies a place between the dogmatic and the psychological methods. It accepts to a large extent the results of the psychological method, and then makes within these results a world for itself. It fills out psychological results into a system. Whereas the psychological method is satisfied with the simpler relations, the speculative strives to bring out the inner relation of things, and aims to show the perfection of the whole.

also Friedrich Albert Lange's "History of Materialism," Bk. II, Chap. II.

¹ See Chapters V and VI.

Here Hegel is the typical example. It is sometimes said that the speculative method admits no assumptions. This statement, however, is extreme ; we can reach nothing without assumptions. Hegel, certainly, begins with an absolutely dogmatic assumption, the objective fact of being. From this as his starting-point he develops his system.

There is a great difference between the theology which results from this method and the old dogmatic theology. Here results are reached by a process of speculative construction which grows like a plant. The plant takes its beginning from a seed, and then, as it grows, draws from earth and air and water, translating each into itself and at every stage of its growth assimilating new material.

Our own method in the examination which we are about to make will be largely psychological. Although as we go on we may be led into a more external and objective treatment, we shall begin by studying the elements of religion. Our subject is given as the psychological elements of religious faith. We are to consider a philosophy of religion.

Why do we not rather say a *science* of religion? Certainly, in so far as accuracy and order are fundamental to the scientific method, our method is to be scientific. In all, however, that is recognized as scientific, the experiments at the outset are as scientific as the accepted results. Before they have been adopted into the body of science, they have order and system. From this point of view neither theology nor philosophy is scientific. In science, furthermore, there is universal agreement as to the object which is to be studied. It is not so in theology. We are to follow the scientific method, but we have not yet reached a point where we can demand general agreement among students of theology and philosophy. There is one other distinction, also, between our study and what is recognized as science. To science all things are of equal value ; it seeks the truth, indifferent as to its value. On the other hand, the study of religion involves judgments of value ; its estimate of the worth of things guides its movements and furnishes a basis for its results. Philosophy is fundamentally

not love of knowledge, but love of wisdom, and wisdom involves a judgment of worth; it is the true life which the philosopher endeavors to reach and to impart. All theological thought since Kant has tended to recognize this. At present, therefore, we speak more properly of a philosophy of religion than of a science of religion.

CHAPTER II

PARTIAL DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION — THE ELEMENTS OF RELIGION — THE PRIMACY OF FEELING

WHAT is religion? We must define it. Yet a complete definition is not possible at the outset. Logically our study gives us the definition at the end, practically we need it at the beginning. We must start with some rough and ready definition, and then the conception may grow more distinct as we go on.

Religion has been defined as identical with morality; but neither this definition nor the modification of it, "morality touched by emotion," satisfies us. If we see a man indignant at some wrong, shall we say that he is religious? Is a man eager for right and justice a religious man? It has been defined, also, as man's effort to perfect himself; but a man may try to perfect himself without religion, and some religions do not pretend to perfection.

Religion implies a relation between us and some being beyond ourselves; it is in part objective, and this definition is purely subjective.

Max Müller says¹ that religion is a mental faculty which, independent of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and various disguises. There are here two statements, one that religion is a mental faculty, the other that it is the apprehension of the infinite. But what is called a faculty is rather potential energy, and religion is rather a result of such a faculty than the faculty itself. Further, our definition must at the outset include all forms of religion, and the early religions cannot be said all to have had the sense of the infinite. Müller's definition, however, comes nearer the ordinary conception of religion than the preceding definition, in that it recognizes in religion the relation to something objective. Count Goblet d'Alviella gives² as a definition of religion the conception

¹ "The Origin and Growth of Religions" ("Hibbert Lectures," 1878), pp. 21, 42.

² "Hibbert Lectures," 1891, pp. 47, 48.

which man forms of his relation with superhuman and mysterious powers on which he depends; and in connection with this we may take the statement proposed by Tylor¹ as the minimum definition, that religion is belief in spiritual beings. According to Réville,² religion is the determination of human life by the sentiment of a bond uniting the human mind to that mysterious mind whose domination of the world and of itself it recognizes, and in the sense of union with which it delights. Here we have an advance, though the form of statement is clumsy. The bond itself, according to this definition, or its sentiment, is not religion. There must be a determination of life, and thus some form of activity appears to be an essential element of religion. There is the assumption, also, that delight is an essential element.

We see already how definitions divide and scatter. Moreover, no one of these definitions is scientific. There are two kinds of defini-

¹ Edward Burnett Tylor, "Primitive Culture," 3d ed., 1891, Vol. I, p. 424.

² Albert Réville, "History of Religions," p. 25.

tion, the inclusive or extensive, and the typical, and to make our definition complete we need both. The inclusive definition includes all specimens which can be covered by the term to be defined; the typical emphasizes the special or more marked characteristics of that which it describes. The definition of man as a biped without feathers is inclusive but not typical; so is Spencer's definition of life as the correlation of internal changes with external changes.¹ In any definition, if we can find what is true of the highest and the lowest forms, we may infer that it is true of the intermediate forms also. But such a definition will include nothing which is not found in the lowest forms, and a definition of religion, therefore, which is to include all religions, must include nothing that is not found in the lowest forms of religion. The typical definition, on the other hand, emphasizing the highest forms rather than the lowest, may not include the lowest. We are to begin with inclusive definitions, and as we advance bring into our conception higher and higher elements,

¹ "First Principles," Pt. I.

proceeding in this way from the inclusive to the concrete, from the abstract to the typical.

Where in life does religion find its seat? Religion is of the spirit, spiritual not in the technical sense, but as being of the inner nature of man. Thus our field is limited, for the elements of the spiritual nature are few. Intellect, feeling or emotion, will — these are the elements of the inner life. Does religion belong primarily to the intellect, or to feeling, or to will? Or if not primarily to some one of these, does it belong to two of them only, or to all three?

We find at once that we cannot consider the intellect by itself; intellect and feeling cannot be separated. Consciousness itself implies a form of intellect, and on the other hand there is no thought which is unaccompanied by feeling; thought is inspired by feeling; we think because we are interested. Therefore we cannot employ the logical method of *difference*, and ask if religion is ever found where feeling is separate from thought, or where thought is free from feeling. There is a second method, however, which we can

employ, that of *concomitant variation*. By this we may determine the relative importance of elements which cannot be separated, and find how far one element is dependent upon another. Does religion, then, vary with variations in thought or with variations in feeling, or as both thought and feeling vary? The answer is clear. Religion varies, not with the variations in thought, but with the variations in feeling. "If I know all mysteries and all knowledge . . . but have not love, I am nothing."¹ Some of the clearest thinkers in theology are not religious, even though they may have belief. On the other hand, some ignorant persons are truly religious.

The first person to put theology upon a purely psychological basis, Schleiermacher, reached the result that feeling is everything in religion. Over against him, Hegel does not deny the reality of feeling, but he gives it a subordinate place as compared with intellect.²

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 2.

² "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," transl. from the 2d German edition by E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson, Vol. I, Pt. I, B, II.

With Hegel the starting-point is transitory and of less importance. In this his method differs from that now in vogue with some who assume that the starting-point explains all. Hegel more wisely lays stress on the final term.

In his criticism of feeling Hegel urges, first, that feeling is indifferent to its content; second, that feeling is private and individual, whereas thought is universal; and third, that feeling is common to man with the brutes, the assumption being that feeling therefore fills a lower place than the intellect. It is perhaps true that feeling is indifferent to its content. Yet feeling is determined by its idea of its object. We may say, for instance, that love is indifferent to its object; that is, a bad man may receive the devoted love of a wife; love gives itself where it can and will. Love, however, idealizes its object; to us, on the outside, love seems to be in pursuit of a worthless object, but to the person who loves this object is its ideal. Further, the feeling varies with the nature of the object; admiration may be felt toward a Washington and toward a prize-fighter; we give the feeling the same name in

both cases. But the feeling itself is not the same; these are two different kinds of admiration. What is true of admiration is true of all emotions, even of love; the love of a great person is different from the love of a base person, the love of a parent different from that of a child. Of course, there is in all love a common, universal element; but there are these differences also. We conclude, therefore, that feeling is not altogether or indeed mainly indifferent to its object.

The second criticism of Hegel, that feeling is private and individual, has much in its favor. *De gustibus non disputandum*; each man's taste is his own. A man's thought may be convinced; his taste cannot be. One man likes a picture, another dislikes it; this dislike or liking cannot be altered by persuasion. Yet feeling is no less universal than thought. We are apt to speak of thought as if a thought existed apart from our minds, and could be taken from one mind and put into another. But thoughts are not the same, they are only similar; your thoughts are yours, mine are mine, they cannot be interchanged; thought is private as

well as feeling. Still it is true that argument can produce similarity of thought, whereas we cannot thus produce similarity of feeling. But why do we wish to produce similarity of thought? Why does a man whose mind is filled with some great idea seek to bring it into the minds of others? He wishes others to share his thought only that they may share his feeling, the feeling perhaps in turn leading to some action. I seek to convince you that your candidate for some office is an unscrupulous politician. Why? In order that you may vote for mine. The preacher tries to convince us of the truth of religion. Why? In order to bring us to his way of feeling and action. Community of feeling is generally the end to which community of thought is but a means. Not that this is always true; but it is true in most practical situations. Further, feeling may propagate itself without the medium of thought, as for example at a camp-meeting or in a riot, when enthusiasm or passion is contagious; or as in some expedition when one of the party who thinks the expedition will fail may not utter his thought, and yet others will

catch his feeling. We recognize, also, that this contagion of feeling may be a sign of health as well as of disease, as when we speak of the contagion of moral enthusiasm.

Hegel's third criticism of feeling is that it is common to the brute with man, and therefore belongs to the lower strata of man's nature, and so is not to be emphasized as an element in religion. Is not thought, however, also common to the brute with man? The brute has the beginnings of intellect as really as the beginnings of feeling, and if we allow that feeling is predominant in the brute, we may say that what is most common and universal in life is most fundamental. Perhaps, however, the brute shares thought with us as fully as feeling; our feelings may be of a higher grade than those of the brute because our thought is higher.

We conclude, therefore, that in religion feeling has the primacy as compared with intellect. How is it as regards feeling and the will? Here we can apply the method of *difference*; for we have instances in which all activity is excluded. A person may be in prison or ill,

and can only endure, and yet in such cases the most beautiful religious life may appear. It is true that here the will often has a place ; the spirit may be rebellious at the confinement, there may be envy of the well or the free, and the will is exerted in an earnest endeavor to subdue wrong feelings ; here is a true activity of the will. Yet, after all, it is a confirmation of the primacy of feeling. For what the will is trying to bring about is a new condition of feeling ; the emphasis is on feeling ; feeling is the essential.

Under normal conditions, however, we find intellect, feeling, and will all necessary. Why, then, should we consider one more truly essential than the others ? There are, however, two uses of the word "essential" : first, to express that which carries within itself the essence of the whole, whatever it may be ; and second, to express that without which a given result is not reached, though such a factor in the result may be less fundamental than others — a *sine qua non*. In a vineyard, for example, the vine, the trellis, the soil, the water for irrigation, each may be, in a certain sense,

essential as a *sine qua non*, because without it the result would be failure. But the relation to the result is not the same with all ; the vine itself is the essential and the others are accessories. So feeling is the essential element in religion.

It is the more important to recognize the primacy of feeling in religion if only because it has the same primacy in life generally. Intellect represents the environment, feeling represents the man. Intellect brings to man his material ; feeling is his response to this material. Intellect is analytic ; feeling recognizes the unity of the object and is constructive. Intellect tries to explain and justify, yet never reaches that in which feeling rejoices. A picture may be all that the intellect can demand, and yet not excite feeling ; the last touch of genius cannot be described, though it may be felt. Thus, again, intellect cannot explain why you love your friend. What you love is not the aggregate of his good qualities, which may belong equally to others whom you do not love. Feeling regards the friend as a unit, filling gaps which the intellect cannot fill.

It is true, however, that intellect is needed by feeling. Intellect not only provides the environment to which feeling responds; it helps, also, to preserve the balance among the feelings. In so far as we can think our environment as a whole, we are less exposed to fluctuations of feeling, and the intellect helps us thus to lump our experiences. The intellect cannot do this alone; a fact is not the same as our thought of a fact; when death comes, it is not the same as our previous thought of it; an immediate fact affects us differently from the presentation of a distant fact, however assured of its reality we may be.

Further, the intellect tends to develop feeling. As the intellect works, it enlarges the environment, and thus stimulates the growth of feeling. You enjoy a simple air, simply played, but you have a different and greater pleasure in listening to a quartette or an orchestra; there is more fulness and richness in the feeling and more intensity. Now this result could not be reached unless the skill of the composer were developed. You may say that, after all, what is essential here is not the

skill of the composer, but the musical sense to which appeal is made. Yet the skilled performance is necessary; it is knowledge which gives opportunity for certain feelings. Feeling is not like a bell which responds to a stroke. A man with his feelings is like an organ which does not give the same response to every touch, but is capable of infinite variation according to the skill of the player. The intellect is the player who draws out the possibilities of the instrument.

All that the intellect can do, however, is not too much to meet the highest feelings. Feeling has the primacy. Intellect is for the sake of feeling. What we do is done to gratify feeling. In science and philosophy, feeling is the beginning, the middle, and the end. The desire to know or to explore, the charm of mental activity, the hope of discovery, eagerness for renown—these in both science and philosophy stimulate the student. Feeling in one form or another first prompts to study, and then through the student's sense of obligation it sustains him in his work. Activity is pleasant, also, and mental activity most

pleasant. Finally, at the end of any study there is the æsthetic joy in success and an enlarged horizon.

CHAPTER III

SUPERFICIAL AND PROFOUND FEELING — THE TEST OF THE WORTH OF FEELING — THE RELATION BETWEEN FEELING AND ACTION

IF feeling, then, is primary, does it follow that the office of religion is to make one "feel good"? No, but to make one a person of good feeling. "Feeling good" is momentary; the quality of good feeling is permanent, the "right heart" of Hegel. We must distinguish between feeling and emotion. It is not always the most emotional men who have the deepest feeling; the man whose religious feeling is most easily stirred is not necessarily the most religious. Emotion is only one form of feeling, something stirred, changing, transient. Two judges may have each a painful case to decide. The appeals to the sympathy of each may be similar. One is greatly moved, and yields to the appeals; the other is firm. We say of the man who yields that he is a man of

feeling; the other we may call cold-hearted. Yet the immovable judge may be a man of stronger and more profound feeling than the judge who yielded. His feeling is simply different in kind, the sense of responsibility and of the importance of maintaining the supremacy of the law, the thought of the results which may follow pardon and freedom, the sorrow likely to be caused by others more liable to crime as they see this man go free.

The emotion of the moment may be real enough, there may not be in it any pretence or dissimulation; but one feeling is driven out by others. We speak in this way of superficial feelings, such as are called forth by one aspect of the environment and not by others. As the environment changes, a man is the creature now of one feeling, now of another. Deeper feeling may vary outwardly with the changes in the environment, but underneath is changeless. The feeling of the mother who loves her child is fundamental and permanent, though it manifests itself in a variety of constantly changing and more or less superficial moods. A certain amount of variability makes

a person interesting; too much variability destroys our respect for him.

What causes the difference between a man of profound feeling and one of superficial feeling? Perhaps their different natures, the intellect, the imagination, the training, of each. As has already been suggested, the intellect or the imagination can present the world as a whole; past and future are made real, and there is less danger of superficial and changeful feeling. Or some master passion may control all the rest, and interpret everything into the same term, as when a person in profound grief is no longer moved by various forms of pleasure. Further, the man of deep feeling lives more according to principle than the emotional man. Principle in this relation need not mean moral principle, for there are two kinds of interest which may absorb one, interest in one's self or interest in one's environment. The thoroughly selfish as well as the thoroughly unselfish man may live by principle, and be similarly unaffected by superficial feelings; the interests of either may be as broad as the whole world, but the selfish man interprets all from the point of

view of his own gain or passion, the unselfish man with a view to the good of others than himself.

In training the feeling, habit and knowledge are great powers. Spinoza suggests, at the close of the "Ethics," that the object most present has most power over the mind; that if we associate the thought of God with every experience, this thought, and also the feelings connected with it, will become more and more masterful. Similarly, if any feeling is to be profound and permanent, it must be associated with every experience.

We speak of men of mere intellect or of mere feeling. What do we mean? Of course there is no such thing as a man who has intellect alone. Intellect must have feeling to prompt it, and must produce feeling. We may almost say that one man has as much feeling as another, and that any difference is not in amount but in kind. What we really mean by the man of mere intellect is the man whose delight is in the processes of thought themselves, who loves the tool rather than what it can effect. One man as he looks at the stars through a tele-

scope is interested in the lenses which he is using, while another is delighted and exalted by what he sees, the revelation of the heavens. Thus when people speak of Goethe and Schiller, comparing what they call the coldness of Goethe with the warmth and humanity of Schiller, they really mean, not that Goethe was without feeling, but that he rejoiced in his art; that was his fundamental interest. Schiller, on the other hand, rejoiced rather in what his art represented, and thus kept in relation with the external world. Goethe may have felt the very deepest delight in his art. To think does not kill feeling; it only changes its direction.

The assumption often is that the exercise of the intellect tends to lessen the force of feeling. The argument is drawn from a physical figure. Here is so much force to be applied; if a certain amount is used in one direction, so much the less remains for use in other ways. The analogy, however, is false. In life, use tends to develop the part exercised without necessarily withdrawing strength from other parts. The strength of a blacksmith's arm has not

been gained at any necessary expense to the rest of the body. The feelings do not grow weak because the intellect is used, but only as they are not themselves exercised. As it is possible to develop the whole physical man, so the entire spiritual nature may be developed. The ideal life is expressed in Tennyson's words :

"Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell."¹

Our greatest difficulty, however, arises from what may be called the conceit of the understanding. The intellect tends to assume that its analysis, and therefore its explanation, is complete, and then that all which can be analyzed is explained; it is always trying to exhaust the content of the universe, and ready to assume that it has succeeded. Thus it tends to check and discourage all feeling that is deeper than the results which the intellect has reached. Whole periods of such "explanation" come, when it is assumed that everything has been made clear. But over against what has been explained there still

¹ "In Memoriam," the prologue.

remains the mystery of the universe, our ignorance in regard to our own lives. Though certain parts of the sphere have been illuminated, the mass is still opaque.

How are we to measure the worth of feeling? Almost every feeling is a judgment of worth, a recognition of values. Now, some values are greater than others. By what test are we to decide that one is greater than another? Is there any measure that we can apply from without? No. It is sometimes said that we test the worth of feeling by the worth of the object which has called forth the feeling; but the truer statement would be that we measure the worth of the object by the nature of the feeling which it has aroused. The object is beautiful because we admire it, good because we approve it. Things are desirable because we desire them. Again we see the primacy of feeling. It is feeling which is the test of feeling. We find, however, that other conditions accompany the feeling which supplies the test. Intellect, taking the hint which feeling has given it, classifies and systematizes, and declares what

is worthy of admiration. In melodious music the ear is the first and final judge; but the intellect makes a science of music, of harmony, conforming always to that which the musical sense recognizes as harmonious. So with all our judgments.

We recognize that there are two aspects of feeling to consider, one the extent of the field covered, the other the intensity of the feeling.

Leaving out the element of intensity for the time being, we may say that the feelings which refer to the largest portion of the environment are the most worthy. This statement is rather crude, but it will prepare the way for something more satisfactory. Why is love for another better than love for oneself? Why is it worthier for A to love B, and B, A, than for A to love A, and B, B? It may be said that the love of A for B opens to A a larger world. Unselfish love is often supposed to destroy love of self; but there is no reason to believe that an unselfish person has less regard for himself than a selfish person. Love of A for B does not destroy love of A

for A, but overpowers it for a time ; A loves not self less, but B more. The feeling, then, which has the larger sweep, which includes the greater portion of the environment, is the more worthy. Further, as soon as we begin to love a thing or a person outside ourselves, and life begins to enlarge, the possibility is present of a life indefinitely larger ; as soon as A begins to love B and his little shell is broken he may from B and C and D easily go on to love X and Y and Z ; he is made capable of infinite possibilities. Thus feeling is measured by largeness.

Now, if the response to a large environment is best, then the universe is a good place in which to live. This is the optimistic view. But in order to hold this view, our response to the environment must be positive. Given a negative response, and we have the attitude found in the Oriental religions, where the universe is regarded as evil and men are counselled to respond to as little of it as possible. "Where ignorance is bliss," we hear it said, "'tis folly to be wise."

We have found that feeling is measured by

largeness. We need, however, to modify this conclusion. Herbert Spencer defines life in terms of length and height,¹ that is, in terms of extension and intension. So it is with feeling; it must have intension as well as extension. Intensity of feeling may even be higher than mere extensiveness or complexity. We may see a thousand details in the flower, and yet miss the beauty which the child finds in it as a whole. The depth of our feeling toward God depends not so much on our recognition of the extent and manifold nature of creation as upon our consciousness of the unity of all things. Compare the ignorant woman who is religious and the scientist who is without religion. Has not the scientist the larger environment? Yes; but the woman has in her less extensive environment that consciousness of the infinite presence beside which the environment of the scientist, in whom the like consciousness is lacking, is as nothing. In the case of feelings obviously less worthy, greater intensity of course only renders them still more unworthy. We reach the greatest height when

¹ "Principles of Biology," Vol. I, Chaps. IV-VI.

we can have both the recognition of unity, the consciousness of the infinite presence, and at the same time the knowledge of details through which the unity, the infinite presence, is manifested.

We meet here the question as to our duty toward a few as compared with our duty toward many. Which is worthier, intensive or extensive affection? We distinguish love for our immediate circle from love for the remoter but larger circle of society in general. How shall we compare the love of a person for his home, while he is more or less indifferent to this larger circle, with the love of those who are interested chiefly in the larger relations and comparatively indifferent to those about them? Some have refused to concede ethical value to family affection on the ground that it is instinctive; but the natural affections have ethical value, and the wider interest in mankind will reach its happiest results in proportion as it becomes equally instinctive with love for the family. It is in a certain intensity of personal feeling that we find the real life, and I should value the feeling of a person

closely bound to his own circle more highly than that of the persons who are indifferent to those near them, and interested in a remoter circle. We should doubt a little the reality of their feeling, and should ask whether it were not some principle other than love, and less worthy, which prompted them to devote themselves to the remoter circle, to the neglect of their families or nearer friends.

The history of the development of philanthropy supports us in this view. Out of affection for the smaller circle has come affection for the larger circle. Love of race has grown from love of family. The interest of a man in the condition of the slaves might, and often did, spring from the tenderness felt toward his own immediate household; and from the same source nowadays may come his interest in the neglected children of the streets.

There are cases in which the intensive affection and the extensive, the personal and the general, come into conflict, and one or the other must give way. Thus, in time of war a man may feel it his duty to leave his home and those who are nearest to him, in order to

serve his country. Yet when he goes we should be sorry if the intensive, personal affection were lost; we should think more highly of him if he went with bleeding heart. When Jesus says, "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me,"¹ there is nothing to imply that love of the Master is inconsistent with the love of father and mother. Here again, if love of the father and mother were wanting, the love of the Master would be unworthy.²

We have now to consider the relation between feeling and action. Here it is important to distinguish between the objective and subjective relations of feeling, between the standard of society and that of the individual. In the case of society we judge the feeling by the result. In the case of the individual we ask what was the motive; the act has worth according to the motive, the feeling, manifested through it. Now when we ask whether society exists for the individual, or the individual for society, we find, if we take the broadest view, that it is society which exists for the individual.

¹ Matt. x. 37.

² 1 John iv. 20; also 1 Tim. v. 8.

The purpose of society has not been accomplished when each member has been clothed and fed; rather society is then just ready to begin its real work, the elevation of the individual, the production of the noblest men and women. We conclude, therefore, that ultimately in all cases the motive is of first importance, and that any act has worth according to the feeling manifested through it.

Under ordinary circumstances, to be sure, we say that the act is the measure of the feeling. The feeling shows itself in some act, and we infer the feeling and judge it from the act. Even so, however, we recognize that the act is a very imperfect measure of the feeling. What is the pressure of the hand to the parting friend, in comparison with our affection for him and our sense of loss in his going? How far is the gift of the dollar, or of the hour of one's time, to some charity, a real measure of the interest which perhaps moves our whole heart? Nowhere has the man full of feeling opportunity for complete expression. You may recall how Browning emphasizes this in the conflict which he represents as taking

place in the mind of Sordello after he has learned his true parentage, and is debating what to do.¹ "All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags." So all expressions of profound feeling are as rags in comparison with that garment without seam, the feeling itself.

Is there not, however, a danger here? Of what value, we may ask, is any feeling if it does not lead to action? That will depend upon whether or not circumstances are such as to render action possible. What is required is only that the sympathy be real, that it be strong enough and deep enough to lead to action if circumstances permit. A sufferer is usually more grateful for sympathy without help, if he sees that the sympathy is real, than for help which does not sympathize. The difficulty in the case of professed feelings which do not result in action is that we lose our faith in the reality of the profession. The act is simply a test, a measure of the feeling.

Some people enjoy the mere stimulation of the feelings. They are moved by fictitious sorrow in stories and on the stage, and are un-

¹ Robert Browning, "Sordello," Bk. VI.

moved by the sorrows of real life. Similarly one may come to look upon the world as a stage, and rather enjoy the pathos of it. In such cases as these, however, we conclude that the feeling is not real, or at least that it is superficial, perhaps an unconscious sense of how bad it would all be if it were true. If the feeling were more real or more profound, it would strive to express itself in action.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRIORITY OF THE RELIGIOUS FEELING AS COMPARED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL CON- CEPT — THE FIRST DEFINITION OF RELIGION

WE have seen that in religion feeling has the primacy as compared with intellect and will. We have now to ask which is first in point of time, the religious feeling or the intellectual concept. Our common habit of thought is to regard intellect as calling out feeling ; if we are to reverence a noble person, we must first believe that the person has those qualities which command reverence. But is not the process sometimes reversed? Does not the feeling in certain cases suggest the thought? A child is being put to bed, and is quiet so long as there is a light in the room ; but as soon as the light is taken away, the child begins to fear that there is a man hidden in the closet. Here it is not at the outset the idea of the man which causes the fear ; but

fear creates an object which, if real, would be the cause or the occasion of fear. In the same way a man alone in the forest hears noises as of wild beasts ; a vague terror of the darkness concentrates itself into a definite idea. In such cases there may be some sound or other suggestion, inadequate, however, in itself to produce the feeling ; the terror takes advantage of the suggestion and fills it out. So with certain temperaments ; the suspicious man believes that he is surrounded by enemies, or by those who are indifferent to him ; his suspicion transforms the slightest and most unconscious acts into deliberate slights and insults.

When we pass to more important examples, we find men sacrificing the most precious things in life, even life itself, for the sake of a feeling which bids them do right. We should expect to find some rational ground for such action. But if we ask different men why they act as they do, we get widely different answers. The feeling precedes all explanation of it. It is not the forms of ethical belief that have created the moral sense, but

the moral sense that has given birth to the intellectual recognition.

We find ourselves here led out into the grandest relations possible, the great ideas of truth and goodness and beauty. In these, feeling seems to come first. The belief in the unity of the universe is taken as a basis for reasoning long before it is consciously admitted. The world acted upon the principle of the uniformity of law for ages before the generalization was formulated. We have a feeling of good faith in things, we do not wonder every morning if the sun will rise. The mind accepts this faith so fully that it has no question about it. You may have heard the story of the old lady who was surprised at Newton's puzzle over the fall of the apple to the ground. "Of course," she said; "where would it fall? It couldn't fall up."

The confidence in the uniformity of law in the world is so natural that we can appeal to nothing else even when we wish to prove it. It would be difficult for us to give ourselves an answer why we trust in it as we do. The instinctive feeling precedes the conscious intel-

lectual recognition. No matter for the present whether this instinct is natural to mind, or is the result of the accumulated experience of the race. All that we need to see is the power of the idea or feeling before the idea is consciously recognized. We do not ask, how many consciously recognize the truth of a doctrine, but how many act as though they recognized it. Here is the fallacy in Locke's argument against innate ideas,¹ that they are not found in children and savages. Although the child or the savage may not be conscious of the idea, he acts as though he were. These great truths are like the sun; they show their power and light before they rise above the intellectual horizon.

We have already seen that this is true in the case of the moral sense. It is equally true in regard to the sense of beauty. For while most of us have some knowledge of what is right, few have knowledge as to what is beautiful, and often where intellectual recognition is strongest and most accurate, the sense of beauty is most lacking.

¹ "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Bk. I.

Beauty cannot be described ; one can only feel it. Try to describe the beauty of a picture, and what you have pointed out may be found in another picture which is not beautiful. Read Poe's account of how he wrote "The Raven."¹ You may fancy that you have a receipt for writing poetry ; but try it !

Is the religious feeling also similar in this regard to the æsthetic feeling and the moral feeling ? Is it, like them, in advance of the intellectual recognition which is logically its basis ? If not, we must ask whence should come the intellectual recognition ? From revelation ? How, then, was the revelation made ? Was it given objectively, coming wholly from without ? This conception is entertained more easily if we assume that the race had a single origin, either as regards some individual person, or in respect to the place of origin. The conception, however, becomes more difficult as the question of origin becomes complex. There is difficulty

¹ Edgar Allan Poe, *Essays*, "The Philosophy of Composition."

also in conceiving how the revelation should be given. Was it written on the heavens, or was there a voice from heaven, or was there an incarnation of the divine upon the earth? If, on the other hand, we conceive that the revelation was given subjectively, impressed upon the nature of the soul, an inner and not an outer revelation, it may have come primarily either through the intellect or through the feeling. So that the answer in this case to our question whether intellectual recognition came through revelation cannot help us unless it can tell us whether the revelation was made through intellect or through feeling.

Another theory of revelation is found in the hypothesis of an actual presentation of the object which excites the religious feeling. This theory is very distinctly stated by Tylor.¹ According to him, religion consists in the recognition of supernatural beings, the knowledge of whom comes through dreams. But does religion consist in this? The facts on which the theory is based may be real ; but

¹ "Primitive Culture," Vol. I, p. 424.

we have here two questions : first, as to the beginning of a belief in immortality ; and second, as to the origin of religion ; and the two questions are not necessarily one and the same. Setting aside any question as to a belief in immortality, does religion consist in a belief in disembodied spirits ? We must apply here the method of difference, and ask whether religion and a belief in spirits necessarily accompany each other. The savage, it is said, dreams, and thinks that he really sees the spirits of the dead. He certainly has a great dread of these spirits ; he tries to propitiate them ; he has even a religious feeling toward them. But the dream is, so to speak, the land in which the spirits dwell. If religion is what this theory assumes, we should suppose that the savage would dread to go to sleep. Just as in Fouqué's story of Undine the hero is afraid of sleep, expecting to be haunted by the water nymph, so according to this theory the savage should feel as if sleep were haunted. He appears, however, to go to sleep with as little fear as the civilized man, and even sometimes prepares for dreamy

sleep by fasting. The belief of the savage, then, in the life of his ancestors after death, is not sufficient as an explanation of religion. It may affect the mind religiously ; we may have, perhaps, all the conditions of Tylor's definition of religion, but we have not religion itself.

Again, if the theory is true, the phenomena of spiritualism should be in all cases religious. I am not here discussing the truth of spiritualism as such, but simply the question as to any necessary connection between its phenomena and religion. We find that there is no such necessary connection. On the contrary, the spiritualist bears himself with as little awe or reverence in the presence of the spirits of the departed as among the living. In the intercourse which is professedly held, we find nothing of religious or even superstitious feeling ; and unless we are to assume that a belief in life after death is religion, we cannot conclude that there is any more religion in the communication with disembodied spirits than in ordinary human intercourse. On the other hand, religious feeling

may exist without the belief in the spirits of the dead. At least, we find a worship of nature which is seemingly independent of any belief in disembodied spirits.

It remains now for us to ask whether the intellectual recognition might be the result of a process of reasoning. It is said that men by reasoning have arrived at certain beliefs which occasion the religious feeling. No doubt this is true to some extent in the development of religion. Here, however, as elsewhere, the very beginnings of history are sealed to us. As far back as we can go we find men religious. We have to use again the method of concomitant variation. Practically and historically we find religious feeling and intellectual recognition coexisting. Is recognition always in advance of feeling, or *vice versa*? Sometimes intellect, sometimes feeling, takes the lead; but feeling appears to have the larger part. Take the case of the classic religions. Here we have definitely recognized objects of worship. We find feeling in advance, a reverence in the early worship which is not justified by the intellectual

conception of the time. Then, as the ethical sense is developed, a higher intellectual conception follows. When, as was well said, the morals of Athens became higher than the morals of Olympus, men were obliged either to give up their worship, or else to confess that their intellectual conception of the gods misrepresented them. Thus the conception of Zeus became an ideal which to the more profound thinker was free from the traits which made the early Zeus unworthy of thoughtful worship. In Christianity, also, we find in the same way the change to higher conceptions of the attributes of God following upon the dissatisfaction of the feeling, the heart, with existing conceptions. Feeling is constantly demanding that the object of worship shall be conceived as altogether worshipful.

Again, a sense of infinitude is essential to religion in its highest form. Now, Hume and Kant are only foremost among many in urging that, so far as the reason is concerned, we could reach no higher conception of life than the manifestation found in the world about us. We cannot reason from the world

to a god having more wisdom and power than is manifested in the world. We might prove the divinity to be *very* good, *very* mighty, but not *absolutely* good and mighty. Yet the thought of Christianity has leaped beyond any conception which could be based on what is found in the external world, has ascribed higher qualities to divinity than a superficial view of the external world would justify. Why? Because feeling has reached a point in its development where it demands this highest conception as essential. It cannot rest in anything less than the infinite, and so it urges the reason on.

It may be said that the influence of feeling upon the intellect is sometimes a source of illusions. It is true that illusions are created by feeling, as when the lover attributes to the object of his affection beauties of person and qualities of mind not found in her by others. Especially may illusion result when some deeper feeling assumes that its object is found in finite form, is already embodied in an individual person. The religious soul clothes some leader with all the glories which it de-

mands in a perfect being, and then, if the leader is found to be in any way frail, the temptation comes to abandon the ideal altogether as being itself an illusion. The feeling, however, which guides reason and the life is that which relates to the universe as a whole. Such feeling is bound up with the human soul itself, it stands nearest to man. It is not the person himself, it only represents him ; but it is his most direct representative, his innermost manifestation.

We conclude from this consideration of the sources which have been proposed for the intellectual recognition that, like the æsthetic and the moral feeling, the religious feeling also is in advance of intellectual recognition. Further, as the result of our examination as a whole, thus far, we reach our first definition of religion. RELIGION IS FEELING, OR ESSENTIALLY FEELING. This first definition is the most abstract and most extensive of the various definitions at which we may arrive. Our later definitions are to add each something more typical, until we reach finally the most distinct and the highest type.

CHAPTER V

SPENCER'S RECONCILIATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION — SCHLEIERMACHER'S DEFINITION OF RELIGION

WE say that religion is feeling. The question at once follows, What kind of feeling? Before we undertake to answer this question, however, let us consider two illustrations of our general theme, Herbert Spencer's reconciliation of religion and science,¹ and Schleiermacher's definition of religion as feeling.

In order to reconcile religion and science it would seem to be necessary, first to determine the nature of each, and then to compare them. Over against the recognized unity of science under its different aspects are many religions. We should naturally, therefore, try first of all to find the common element in all religions to oppose to the unity of science, discovering their

¹ "First Principles," Pt. I, Chaps. I-V.

agreements and their differences, and throwing aside the differences.

Spencer, however, proceeds in a somewhat different way. Without entering much into comparisons, he assumes that the common element in all religions is the question as to the origin of the world. To this question he finds three kinds of answers, the atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic. Each and all of these answers, however, he regards as unthinkable, because they involve us in contradictions. Hence he concludes that the basis of all religion is mystery, a question which cannot be answered, and he fortifies his position by reference to statements of the theologians expressing their sense of mystery. By a similar process he shows that the fundamental notions of science—force, space, etc.—issue in self-contradiction and mystery. Hence, religion and science both rest on mystery. Religion looks one way, recognizing the mystery itself, the unknown and unknowable cause or basis of the universe. Science looks in the other direction, and sees what is built upon this basis of mystery. Science is the seemingly solid crust

of snow on which men erect a shelter, and religion is the sense of the vacancy beneath.

Have we here a real reconciliation? We meet with difficulties at once. In the first place, religion is not an answer to a question, certainly not to a question as to the origin of the world. In the history of religion the cosmogonists come late; people did not wait for the religious feeling until they knew how the world was made. The first question of the cosmogonists, too, concerns the arrangement of the world rather than its creation. For the most part the older divinities took shape out of the thought of the spirits of the dead, or out of the personification of natural objects and forces. They represent, not the creators of these forces and objects, but their powers, the help or the peril which may come from them. Agni is not represented as the creator of fire, but is the power of fire. Poseidon is not the creator of the ocean, but the personification of its power and majesty. Religion is not the recognition or the worship of the creator of things, but of the divinity in things.

The question, "Who made it?" is not natural

to the child or to the savage. At times it may appear so, but in such cases we have to ask how much has entered the thought of the child or the savage from those with whom he has come in contact. Ordinarily the child and the savage recognize three sorts of things, inorganic, organic, and manufactured. The inorganic is simply taken for granted as existing, the organic is thought of as having grown, and the manufactured as put together. Life, they think, simply grew; Topsy's answer, "I 'spect I grow'd," tells their view of it. In our own time also the question as to creation, taken alone, holds an unimportant position, and the term "Creator" is less used than formerly. The question as to the origin of the world is scientific rather than theological, scientific, that is, in the larger sense. Religion may use the answer, but cannot give the answer. God made the flower, but how it was made science alone can tell. Religion will find God in the world; how it finds him does not matter. The question that religion first asks is not, "Who made the world?" but "Who will help me and whom shall I thank

for my favors?" Religion has to do, not with the past, but with the present and the future.

In the second place, Spencer's use of the term "mystery" is ambiguous. We do indeed owe a debt to him for emphasizing that which is one of the great elements in religion. Although the place which it fills is secondary, although that which calls forth the religious feeling is not so much what is known to be not known as what is known, still a religion without mystery would be extremely superficial and unworthy. A religion which should assume that everything is accounted for by its formulas would be imperfect and prosaic. As the darkness adds to life the element of awe, so the sense of mystery adds impressiveness to religion. Take the thought of death and of the future life. A religion which saw the future life continuing our ordinary relations, and took from death its mystery, might bring to some a certain comfort; but we should lose in it an important element which belongs properly to religion. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the

heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.”¹

The mystery, however, which Spencer discovers is that which appears to the outsider who looks upon religion to study and analyze it, not the mystery felt by the worshipper before his God. The worshipper is fully satisfied with the answer which he receives to the question, who made the world; he finds in it no self-contradiction; for him it simply testifies to the power and grandeur of his divinity. “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;”² the worshipper accepts the answer as a simple fact, and rests in the greatness and the glory of it. This is the mystery which the theologians have recognized in the object worshipped, the mystery which Isaiah found; “Neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord.”³ It is not, however, the whole of the religion of the theologians nor the essential part of it. What they find essential is the positive aspect of religion, the great truths and facts about God.

Further, religion and science stand less in

¹ Is. lxiv. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 9.

² Gen. i. 1.

³ Is. lv. 8.

antithesis to each other than Spencer recognizes. If it is true of science that it builds upon mystery, the same is equally true of religion. Religion has its structure as truly as science. Each has its system of doctrines, each its positive beliefs, each its mystery veiled by its beliefs. Spencer's reconciliation sweeps away the structures of both, all that is positive in both, and leaves only the empty places where they were.

The ideal reconciliation would find something in common between religion and science, not in their negative, but in their positive aspects. There were at one time two theories in regard to the formation of the earth, the igneous and the aqueous, but we do not hear of them now. How have they been reconciled? If Spencer's method of reconciliation between science and religion had been followed, the argument would have been, that the world was in some way formed, that neither theory was adequate to explain the formation, and that the theories were thus reconciled in that both were impotent. If, however, while we grant that either theory

by itself is inadequate, we recognize that each has contributed something toward the final explanation, then we have a reconciliation which is no longer negative, but positive. Spencer himself gives us a beautiful type of positive reconciliation in his solution of the problem between the *a priori* and the experimental schools of philosophy.¹ According to the *a priori* philosophers we construct the world under categories born in us. The experience-philosophers hold that the mind is a blank at the outset, and that all ideas are the result of experience. Spencer reconciles the two by saying that we do come into the world with innate ideas, but that these ideas are the result of our inherited experience. Looking at present fact, the *a priori* philosophers are right; looking at ultimate fact, the experience-philosophers. The *a priori* philosophers, dealing in theories, are found to be the school which actually recognizes facts as they are; the experience-philosophers, insisting upon fact, and urging that all ideas result from the pressure of

¹ "First Principles," Pt. I, Chap. V.

outward conditions, are found to be wrong in fact, but right in ultimate theory. Granting what is assumed, we have here a perfect type of reconciliation. It is very interesting in itself, and it illustrates the method which we should follow in seeking a reconciliation between religion and science.

Let us turn now to the definition of religion given by Schleiermacher, the theologian and philosopher who has made most of feeling as an element in religion. We shall find his presentation inadequate; but no writer has had more influence on modern theological thought. He is one of the pillars of Hercules, with Hegel the other, that mark the entrance through which one passes into modern theology.

We find two statements by Schleiermacher, the one popular, the other scientific, the "Reden"¹ and the "Glaubenslehre."² The "Reden" were addressed to the cultivated people of his time, who had little sympathy

¹ "Reden über die Religion," 1799.

² "Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche;" 1st ed., 1821-1822; 2d ed., 1830-1831.

with religion. He undertook to win them to the support of religion, trying not to make them religious, but to prove to them that they were religious, or at least had within them the germs of the religious life. There is a certain sophistry in these discourses, but it is the result of his purpose. His method is that of the hunter or soldier, who draws a cordon around those whom he is to take and then closes in upon them. Religion is feeling; no one can deny that he has feeling; therefore no one can deny that he is religious. This is the first statement, and it is against this that the objection made by Hegel to Schleiermacher's definition has its full force. The circle, however, is drawn closer and closer as we proceed. Feeling must be healthy and normal; it must be complete, toward all. Complete feeling should be not in successive moments, but toward the whole at once. But this involves the unity of the world. Feeling, then, must be toward the *Weltgeist*. The *Weltgeist* may be either personal or impersonal; Schleiermacher himself recognizes not a per-

sonal, but a spiritual God. In the first edition of the "Reden," a certain intellectual element, *Anschauung*, was added to the modifications of feeling; but this is omitted in later editions.

Schleiermacher's most general statement, that feeling is religion, must be taken in its more developed form, in which the qualifications have been added. Between the first general statement and this later developed form there is a seeming contradiction which he never explained. It is possible that he considered such broken feelings as are commonly experienced not true feeling. If, for instance, we say that all sound is music, musicians would at once contradict us. But suppose we say that sound is not to be judged by the accident of noises, but must be left to follow out its laws instead of being broken up by its environment. In this way we could make out a good case, and it may be that Schleiermacher had some such idea of feeling. He speaks very slightly of superficial feeling, as for example that of the woman who goes aimlessly about in the woods exclaim-

ing at pretty flowers. If we ask what test shall be applied to ascertain how far feeling is profound, the only test is one not expressly admitted by Schleiermacher, although he hints at it, that the more profound feeling is that which touches the greater environment. By this test we should find that the feeling which relates to only a small part of the environment is not true feeling; true feeling would be the contact of the whole man with the whole environment.

Schleiermacher's position has a strategical advantage. No intellectual statement is necessary for religion. Religion is distinct alike from intellect and from will. It prompts directly to no act. Thus religion is freed from responsibility for the dogmas of the church and for the wars and persecutions for which it has been blamed. It is like music. Music is pure, though it may accompany armies; we cannot object to it that it has been used by people who were guilty of crimes; we cannot complain of its use in teaching of which we do not approve. So it is with religion.

In the "Glaubenslehre" we have Schleiermacher's later statement. Here again he insists upon feeling; but the account which he gives of it and the method of presentation are both different. The style is no longer poetic and voluptuous, as in the "Reden," but dry and formal, the discussion of a system of theology addressed to thoughtful students. All feelings now are gathered into one; *absolute dependence* not merely accompanies religion, but is religion. It is discouraging to see the misunderstandings which have gathered about this statement. The Duke of Argyll, for instance, says¹ that if the sense of absolute dependence is religion, a great deal is included which cannot be called religion; a man clinging to a log in the stream is absolutely dependent upon it, but he has no religious feeling toward it. So D' Alviella,² when he says that according to this definition of religion a man would have to worship everything, from his own limbs to the law of gravitation. In

¹ "Unity of Nature," p. 453.

² Count Goblet d' Alviella, "Hibbert Lectures," 1891, p. 69.

these criticisms we find the same misconception. They fail to recognize the full meaning with which Schleiermacher uses the term "absolute." The Duke of Argyll does not distinguish it from partial, D'Alviella disregards it altogether. When a man is floating on a log in the stream, the log is indeed a *sine qua non*; but there is a difference between a *sine qua non* and absolute dependence; the man is not wholly dependent upon the log alone, but on many other things beside, such as air and food and warmth. In the same way a man could not exist by the law of gravitation alone. In all these relations the man's dependence is partial, not absolute. The absolute dependence of Schleiermacher is far more complete and intimate and penetrating. If that on which one is absolutely dependent is present, one needs nothing more. Absolute dependence is that which goes through and behind all things. The universe shares this dependence, not *a* sense, but *the* sense, of absolute dependence; for there is but one unity of the universe and one spiritual centre, and one possibility of absolute dependence.

Even Pflleiderer¹ fails to reach the real meaning of this absolute dependence. If the sense of dependence is religion, he says, then the Mohammedan is the most religious of men; for he is a fatalist; for him all is appointed, and he submits to the will of Allah. But this is superficial, external dependence. The Moslem accepts his fate at the will of Allah simply as one who is dependent upon the power of another which is greater than his own. Absolute dependence is something more intimate than any fate dependent upon another's will. It is penetration, through and through. We cannot live, think, feel, be anything, merely in ourselves. Absolute dependence is not that of one personality upon another over against it, disposing of it as it will; absolute dependence is the relation to the spiritual centre in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom we are nothing.

Suppose the submission were unwilling. Would such dependence be religion? Willing

¹ "The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant," trans. by J. Frederick Smith, Bk. II, Chap. II.

or unwilling, from Pfeiderer's standpoint it must be religion. But if a person submits unwillingly, he has not yet reached the sense of absolute dependence; he still thinks of himself as something apart and independent in that he protests.

Schleiermacher recognizes three stages in psychical development. In the first we have confused self-consciousness. The dog has no distinct sense of his own individuality or of the world as over against him. This is the life of the child before he can say "I." In the second stage there is action and reaction, the relation of give and take, the man over against the world. Man depends partly on himself, partly on the things about him, and in turn many things depend upon him. He affects the outside world, and the world reacts upon him. Then comes the third stage, the sense of absolute dependence, all this little action and reaction disappearing. The sense of partial independence is lost. Man utters the cry of absolute dependence, and in so doing speaks not only for himself, but as the high priest of the universe.

This sense of absolute dependence is not merely something which forms a part of religion, as with Calvin; it is religion itself, nothing else than religion, and religion nothing else than it. It follows that the perfectly religious man would be one who should live wholly in the sense of absolute dependence; absolute irreligion would be found in the entire absence of this sense; and the degree of one's religion would be marked by the greater or less degree of ease with which the mind entered into the state of dependence. Thus some men are more religious than others, and the same man may be more religious at one time than at another, because it is more difficult to reach the state of absolute dependence at certain times and under certain conditions than at other times and under other conditions.

CHAPTER VI

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SCHLEIER- MACHER'S DEFINITION — CRITICISM OF THE DEFINITION — EXAMINATION OF THE AT- TEMPTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO SUPPLY WHAT IS LACKING IN THE DEFINITION

LET us see what is the psychological view on which Schleiermacher bases his definition. At this point we shall find Weissenborn's "Introduction" ¹ most helpful. According to Schleiermacher, the intellect and the will occupy two extremes like the poles of a magnet. The will is to be moved by the intellect, but how is the intellect to reach the will? Now in passing from one pole of the magnet to the other a point of indifference is found. In the same way, as we pass from the intellect to the will, we find an intermediate point which is neither will nor intel-

¹ Georg Weissenborn, "Vorlesungen über Schleiermachers Dialektik und Dogmatik."

lect. This neutral, undifferentiated point is feeling, the centre of gravity, if we may use the term, of human nature. Intellect acts on feeling, and through feeling reaches the will. We have already seen that feeling may influence intellect; but in this case intellect reacts upon feeling before feeling acts upon will. In feeling we have the undifferentiated man, the individual as such, while intellect and will represent the differentiated man.

We can now understand better why feeling is the only medium by which we come into contact with God. Action and reaction imply identity. The self and the external world are one. The external world acts on us through the intellect, and we react on the external world through the will. Subject and object are two aspects of universal being. The undifferentiated centre of being, where subject and object are one, the absolute unity of being, that is God. Now since feeling is the undifferentiated point in us, it is in feeling that we find God; it is through feeling that we come into relation with his attributes. God cannot be reached by thought,

for thought implies differentiation, and has to do with what is separate from us and over against us. Feeling finds God — yet only in part, only as he is found in ourselves. The intellect is always over against the object. Feeling, finding itself one with the object, cannot state the object in terms of consciousness. In the attempt to reach truth intellect thus gives us philosophy, feeling gives us religion.

Again, as God is absolute form, and chaos is absolute matter, both God and chaos are unthinkable, and therefore can never be fully known. We cannot conceive anything so abstract as to have no content, anything so concrete as to have no form. Therefore, the two extremes, the absolutely universal and the absolutely individual, are unthinkable and unknowable.

We have here extreme agnosticism united with profound religious feeling, an emotional religion with an agnostic philosophy. This agnosticism excludes all dogma, and the theology of Schleiermacher consists simply in the translation of various dogmas into terms of

absolute dependence. God is that which corresponds to and makes possible the sense of dependence ; whatever is not dependent is excluded from theology. The divine eternity, for instance, is in itself foreign to the thought of dependence, or rather includes more than the thought of dependence ; but although God is eternal outside of time, yet time and all temporal relations depend upon him, and thus the divine eternity in this aspect represents a form of dependence. The goodness of God is the dependence upon him of the moral law. The compassion or tenderness of God may not be translated into terms of dependence ; it is a phrase which, according to Schleiermacher, belongs rather to homiletical and devotional use than to theology.

To a certain extent Schleiermacher agrees with both Kant and Spinoza ; with Kant he recognizes the fact that we are powerless to know the reality of the outward universe ; with Spinoza he recognizes the absolute unity manifested in the universe within us and without. We find in Schleiermacher the same subjectivity as in Kant, and both recognize the ultimate

foundation of things as being in feeling and not in thought. With Schleiermacher, however, the positive finds expression more readily than the negative. His recognition of the agnostic principle is after all cold; but in the thought of the absolute unity, in the recognition of the world as being in God and dependent upon God, he turns toward Spinoza with an enthusiasm of sympathy and reverence.

We have seen that in Schleiermacher's view no divine attributes can be recognized except those which grow out of the relation of absolute dependence in which we stand toward God. In such a conception of religion there is little room for forms of worship. Little praise can be offered, no direct obedience is possible. We have only on the one hand mystery, as in the Unknowable of Spencer, the recognition of that which cannot be formulated, and on the other hand mysticism, the recognition or sense of a community between the individual life and the absolute life. This sense of community between the human and the divine varies in form. It may be of the sort which underlies all profound, positive religion, the mysticism

of Paul when he says, "In him we live and move and have our being,"¹ the mysticism which takes form in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This is the normal form of mysticism. Another sort results, abnormal and fantastic, when the individual life, believing itself one with the absolute life, assumes that its thoughts are the thoughts of God, and mistakes the vagaries of the imagination for divine revelation. We have to distinguish also between mysticism and pantheism. In pantheism God is lost in the world, and is no longer related to it; he has no reality except in nature, and ceases to be self-related and to have consciousness. Now, religion implies some term of self. Therefore no religion is possible in real pantheism. When men say that they are pantheists they usually mean that they are mystics like Paul. For this mysticism there is perhaps no better formula than Schleiermacher's sense of absolute dependence.²

The first general criticism to be made in regard to the definition of Schleiermacher is that, while it is apparently psychological and sub-

¹ Acts xvii. 28.

² See also Chap. X, pp. 167-169.

jective, it really is dogmatic. Schleiermacher gives no evidence that he has studied religious life in its various manifestations, and arrived at his definition after careful and accurate analysis. He has reasoned *to* feeling and not *from* it. Like Spencer, he has made the content of his religion, his definition of religion, to fit his philosophy. From the intellectual side the definitions of both Spencer and Schleiermacher fit their philosophies ; their thought has place for the kind of religion which they recognize. But if they had begun by studying the religions of the world, the different ways in which the religious life has found expression, Spencer would have found in religion more than the sense of mystery, and Schleiermacher something besides the sense of dependence.

Yet with all its imperfections the definition of Schleiermacher has had a great influence. What are the elements of its power? First, all that is positive in it is indisputably true. Absolute dependence is an essential of all true religion. It is not the element first reached either by nations or by the individual life ; but when once the conception of religion is com-

plete, it is found to be at the centre and heart of all. In the second place, the sense of dependence is a feeling more easily awakened and stimulated in the religious spirit than any other, partly because it is independent of any argument, and partly because it is also independent of any mood. Again, one religious feeling when excited naturally introduces others by the power of association. When, therefore, we recognize the truth of absolute dependence, there follows also, in some degree, the fulness of the other feelings. We think that all have arisen out of the first feeling, whereas in reality they have come simply through association with it. Finally, the definition of Schleiermacher rejects in all that has grown up about religion whatever is merely formal and has no true relation to human life. All creeds and theories which are without this vital relation it casts aside as not belonging to the reality of religion.

It is possible, however, to make our criticism of this definition more careful and profound. Religion corresponds to the whole nature.

Now in its completeness the reason involves three ideas, truth, goodness, and beauty, and any philosophy of religion should recognize all three elements. But as Kant recognized only the second, excluding the possibility of knowing God, so Schleiermacher, although his æsthetic sense is strong, recognizes only the first element, the absolute unity. The language which Goethe puts into the mouth of Faust when he is seducing Margaret is an expression of Schleiermacher's religion :

“Wer darf ihn nennen?
Und wer bekennen :
Ich glaub' ihn?”

Here the need in religion of the recognition of other elements than feeling is plain enough ; the recognition of the moral law at least must be added. If Faust had been in the mood of Kant, and had recognized the absolute as good, the result might have been different. It is not enough for religion to tell us that we are absolutely dependent ; there must be found in it the elements which shall give an impulse to the life.

To complement the definition of Schleier-

macher, his followers have added to it the sense of freedom. Freedom and dependence are antithetical; each needs the other. Yet at first sight each seems antagonistic to the other. A reconciliation is found in the assumption that freedom grows out of the sense of dependence. According to Pfleiderer,¹ consciousness of ourselves and consciousness of the universe, of the *me* and of the *not me*, these are the two elements in complete consciousness. They are antithetical and opposite, self-consciousness demanding freedom, asserting itself, the world-consciousness recognizing limit, necessity. We have, then, a situation which involves the worst kind of servitude, the sense of dependence accompanied by the consciousness in the soul that it was made for freedom. From this servitude and strife some escape must at least be sought. It cannot be found in either element; it must be found in that on which both elements depend, in God.

This is an interesting and important view of religion. It is another expression of what Kant has said in the eloquent passage on the

¹ "Religionsphilosophie," 3d ed., 1893, pp. 257, 258.

moral law and the heavens.¹ In form the reconciliation is perfect. There is no compromise. Both self and the universe are dependent upon God; both are divinely appointed. The universe is the sphere within which freedom is to be exercised and the aim of self worked out. The world, instead of being the enemy of man's freedom, becomes the servant of his freedom. At first I feel myself in collision with the world about me; I am but a point in it; I find myself constantly thwarted: but I am God's creature, and this is God's world; I am sent to accomplish certain ends; the difficulties which I must overcome, themselves a part of God's world as I am part, must be the very things by which I am to develop my highest life and so work out the ends which I am to accomplish. Or suppose that a servant tries to do his duty among other servants who shirk their duty and persecute the first servant; the first servant will chafe at first, but when he considers how dependent all are upon the master, he is lifted above all anxiety to satisfy the others. In the same

¹ "Critique of Practical Reason," Pt. II, Conclusion.

way the fear of breaking the moral law lifts one above all other fears. The sense of dependence upon God thus frees men from the sense of dependence upon their environment.¹

All this is satisfactory so far as it goes. Yet we do not find in these statements a real complement to the definition of Schleiermacher. The sense of freedom does not supply what is lacking in the definition which finds religion in the sense of absolute dependence ; nor can it be regarded as a fundamental element in any definition of religion. If we were so to regard it, we should be attempting, in the first place, to put that which is secondary on the same plane with that which is primary. For if we grant that freedom is the outgrowth, the result, of dependence, we have obviously primary and secondary elements, and to place these two elements on the same plane is not properly to define. Further, to consider the sense of freedom a fundamental element of religion, is to put the subjective in the place of the objective. Religion is in one way or

¹ See also Biedermann (Alois Emanuel), "Christliche Dogmatik," 2d ed., 2 vols., 1884-1885.

another a relation between man and some power outside of man, and nothing can be a fundamental element of religion which does not involve this relation. The sense of dependence does involve it; but the sense of freedom touches nothing outside of ourselves, it involves only a sort of self-relation. Again, the sense of freedom is not real, but formal. Of course, what we mean by freedom in this connection is not freedom of the will, but freedom of development. Nothing is more formal than such freedom, and nothing may be more worthless than what is merely formal. Freedom is worthy or not, according to the use which is made of it; it is sought, not for itself, but for that which it gives one the power to do. If we compare the freedom of the drunkard who refuses to take the pledge because he "will not sign away his liberty" with the freedom which Luther desired, we see how entirely formal the thought of freedom is.

No, the sense of freedom is a resultant of religion. To include it among the fundamental elements of religion is a mistake. How, then, shall we complement the definition of Schleier-

macher? Religion is more than the sense of dependence, but to add the sense of freedom is a mechanical suggestion only. Schleiermacher's definition is true in so far as it insists upon one element in religion, and that the most profound and important. To complement it we must seek the other elements which stand in the same relation to religion. In the thought of dependence we have the recognition of absolute unity, of universal truth; but goodness and beauty are the other ideas of the reason, and Schleiermacher's definition is lacking in that it recognizes only unity, and provides no place for beauty and goodness. Yet it is due largely to the recognition of goodness and beauty that we have worship. The worship which comes from the sense of dependence alone is much like that found in the Upanishads, the expression only of the idea that God is the all, and that all depends upon him. Not only is such worship in itself limited, but the controlling force of religion in life is lessened. In the sense of dependence we find no impulse to largeness and fulness of life; the religion which it expresses is one

of withdrawal and absorption rather than of self-manifestation.

The thought of Schleiermacher involves certain assumptions not infrequently made. The first is that religion is primarily a relation to the infinite.¹ This is in a way true. The conscious recognition, however, of the infinite as the object of religion comes late; religion does not begin with it. The savage first recognizes his divinity as stronger than himself, and what he seeks is enough strength to help him in his needs; then the thoughts of goodness and beauty lead the worshipper to a higher plane, and last of all comes the realization of the infinite. Now, if we approach this realization through previous conceptions of truth and goodness and beauty, we can carry into our thought of the infinite some content; but if we start with the thought of the infinite, our conception remains a form, abstract and empty, without content.

I said just now that religion does not begin with a recognition of the infinite. There is,

¹ Cf. F. Max Müller, "Hibbert Lectures," 1878, Lecture 1, pp. 11-26.

however, in the trust or fear of the early religions an element which separates this trust or fear from ordinary trust and fear. We may find that this element is a sense of the infinite, the recognition of a power which is the negative of the finite. If so, then we may say that the sense of relation to the infinite is found at the two extremes of religion, its beginning and its end. We see this in the development of Brahmanism, where the early trust or fear changes until at last we have the thought of the absolute, and nothing more. At these extremes the relation is found, although of a kind which we can hardly recognize as religion; but if the idea of relation to the infinite were an essential element in religion, we should find it at all stages of religious development.

The other assumption involved in Schleiermacher's thought is that the infinite is pure abstraction, the negation of all content. We have just seen that this is the conception which results if we begin with the thought of the infinite. But we have also seen that if we approach the infinite from the side of truth

and goodness and beauty, we carry into the conception of the infinite the content of these ideas of the reason. We find thus in the infinite, instead of pure abstraction, the absolutely concrete.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND DEFINITION OF RELIGION: THE
FEELING TOWARD THE SUPERNATURAL —
DEFINITION OF THE SUPERNATURAL — SU-
PERSTITION — THE SUPERNATURAL CONSID-
ERED AS NEGATIVE

WE reached as our first definition of religion, the most abstract possible, the statement that religion is feeling.¹ To reach our next definition we must ask, What kind of feeling? The answer will necessarily be unsatisfactory ; for this second definition, like the first, must be inclusive, covering nothing that is not found in the very lowest forms of religion.

What, then, is the sort of feeling which we call religion? We are using the term "religion" now in its widest sense, including superstition. How are we to define feeling so that another shall know what we mean? Feeling is subjective. A person who has had no experience of

¹ Page 51.

a feeling cannot understand it through another's description; we have to refer to the object toward which the feeling is directed. We say, for instance, that a man is purse-proud; there is a qualitative distinction between such pride and family pride. Here we have had to call the intellect to our help, to provide the trellis for the vine; thought has been necessary to bring feeling to higher consciousness. So in religion feeling depends for its development upon the intellect.

We shall be helped in forming our second definition of religion if we look at the result reached by the savage. The religious feeling of the savage is aroused by some object which has influenced his life for good or for evil without the medium of the physical organs through which such influence is ordinarily exercised, that is, by spirits of the dead, or by a plant or a stick or a stone, which, without any external, physical contact, but simply by good will or ill will, have made themselves felt in his life. The action of such objects he considers divine or magical. They produce an effect without resort to the means by which the will ordina-

rily manifests itself. Now this production of an effect apart from the means usually employed is what we commonly call supernatural as distinguished from natural.

Let us take, then, as our second definition of religion, THE FEELING TOWARD THE SUPERNATURAL.¹ I have said that this definition is inclusive. If we think of the various forms in which religion is found, we see that all involve some reference to something supernatural, using the term "supernatural" in its broadest and vaguest sense. The Buddhist recognizes among a number of divinities no object of supreme worship; but his whole life is controlled by the thought of what is to happen after death. In the Hebrew religion we have the barest, most abstract thought of life after death, but there is the recognition of Yahweh as the controlling power in this life, an intense impression of a living, divine power. From our own present point of view, religion is not only a belief in the supernatural, but a feeling toward it, and this feeling affects the life

¹ Cf. Count Goblet d'Alviella, "Hibbert Lectures," 1891, p. 47.

equally with belief. Besides its inclusiveness, our definition has this advantage, that it offers room for development. We can rise from the lowest type with which we begin to higher types, without abandoning or changing the original form of definition. For our feeling toward the supernatural will vary as our thought of the supernatural varies.

What do we mean, however, by supernatural? What do we mean by natural? The term "nature" is of course used in many senses, and a definition which should include all would hardly be serviceable to us in this connection. What we here mean by nature is the universe considered as a composite whole, and the supernatural is that which stands in antithesis to this composite whole. Now there are two aspects under which we may view a composite whole. First, we may think of it as regards the relation of the parts to one another. If the whole is more than a mere aggregate, then the parts have a certain orderly, definite relation one to another. Anything which interferes with this usual relation of the parts to one another may then be called supernatural ;

the supernatural will be the disturbing influence. But, secondly, the term "composite whole," in which we have unity of combination, may also involve a non-composite whole not made up of elements brought together; a whole, that is, forming a unity in and through which all these elements of the composite whole have their being, and which manifests itself through them all. We may say, for example, that in one sense space is an aggregate of extensions; but these extensions would have no significance if it were not for space as a whole; space is that in which all spaces have their being. This, however, is an imperfect illustration. The one perfect illustration is the human mind. From one point of view our consciousness would seem to be made up of various thoughts and feelings. In another aspect all these thoughts and feelings, these various elements of consciousness, have no meaning without the unity of consciousness in and through which they exist, and which in turn manifests itself through them. The human mind is thus a unity manifesting itself in and through diversity.

Spinoza's use of the term "nature" helps to make this clear. He speaks of the *natura naturata*, the body or effect of the *natura naturans*, the unity which manifests itself through all things. The *natura naturata* of Spinoza corresponds to that which we here call natural, his *natura naturans* to what we call supernatural. Our use of the term "nature" is only one of several which are possible, but although it is used in other senses, the sense in which we are here to understand it is not forced, but is the more usual sense. When, for instance, we speak of the natural sciences, we mean those sciences which refer to the relations which natural objects bear to one another; we do not speak of psychology as a natural science, but we do so speak of mineralogy. In theology also the "natural man" is he who conceives that life consists in the abundance of the things which he possesses; that is, he lives in the nature which we have described as composite; in the state of grace he has been taken out of this composite life and brought into relation with the absolute life. The poetic use does indeed more nearly

approach the *natura naturans* of Spinoza; here nature is personified. Ordinarily, however, as I have said, the term "nature" designates the universe considered as a composite whole.

We saw that in antithesis to nature viewed as a composite whole, whose elements stood in orderly relation to one another, the supernatural was that which interfered with the usual relations of the parts, the disturbing influence. When, however, nature is viewed as a composite whole which exists in and through a non-composite unity, then the supernatural is this non-composite unity. The thought of the supernatural does not at all of necessity imply a conception of spiritual beings. In Buddhism we have no absolute divinity, no god; the religion is in a most profound sense atheistic. Yet it is a religion because it is a feeling toward the supernatural. With the thought of life as a part of nature, there is constant relation to that which may or may not come after death, and thus the supernatural, that which is beyond nature, is a controlling power in atheistic Buddhism.

No, in itself the supernatural is simply a negative term. It does not necessarily imply even superiority. As the term "superfluity" merely designates that which is in excess, without implying that the excess is different in quality from that which was enough to fill the measure, so "supernatural" means primarily only something which we do not include in the term "nature"; only its negative relation to the natural is implied. Experience, however, adds a content to terms which at the outset are only negative. The term "inorganic," for example, depends at first for its significance upon the term "organic," and is simply something which has no organs; but as a matter of fact it does have for us a positive, definite meaning, because we have learned by experience what sort of things belong to the inorganic world. In the same way we shall find, as we proceed, that we can give to the term "supernatural" a positive content. Two kinds of religion, then, are suggested by our definition, the feeling toward the supernatural as negative, and the feeling toward the supernatural as positive.

The thinnest form of the supernatural is that from which all definite content is excluded, and there is found only the vague sense of the supernatural. Suppose that a person wakes in the night and puts his hand upon a dead body, something unmistakably dead. He is startled; he experiences a sensation of the unusual; he may be afraid. Yet there is nothing to fear. What, then, is the nature of his feeling? It is the sense of the supernatural. So far as the individual is concerned, death is the breaking up of the natural world. The contact with the dead body brings us abruptly into definite touch with something which implies the nothingness of the visible, natural world. Similarly, in looking over a precipice, we are moved, not so much by the fear of falling, as by the sense of a vastness which is alien to us. We overcome this feeling after a little; and in the same way those who are accustomed to contact with the dead—surgeons, undertakers, and others—lose the sense of fear. It is the feeling that we are touching the limit of the natural, and are as it were chilled by the breath of the

supernatural, which disturbs us; as soon as the experience becomes familiar, the feeling passes.

Some experience a similar feeling when in the dark.¹ An easy method of explaining this fear, adopted of late, is to throw the responsibility back upon our savage ancestors. It is said that they were timid in the dark because they were then liable to be attacked, and that we inherit an organic reminiscence. This theory, however, is hardly sufficient. Our ancestors were quite as likely to be attacking as they were to be attacked, and we cannot think that they were a timid set. No, it is simply that in the darkness the world familiar to us is swept away. Our world is made up primarily of color; that is the aspect under which it usually presents itself to us. In the darkness this is gone, and a strange world is about us, the negation of our familiar world. As in the contact with death, the realization that we had reached the limit of our familiar world chilled us, so now we are again chilled

¹ See Charles Lamb, "Essays of Elia," "Witches and other Night Fears."

as the familiar world is blotted out by the darkness. It is the negation of the natural, the sense of the supernatural in this first, primary meaning of it which has aroused fear. We have seen already how such a fear creates an object for itself in the thought of a person under the bed or behind the door; the uncanny feeling needs an object and so creates one; the object does not create the feeling, but the feeling the object.

Superstition stands in a curious relation to religion. In all accounts of all forms of religion superstitions have their place. Yet when we speak otherwise than historically, we consider superstition as something over against religion. We call the highest forms of savage worship superstition, and we speak of that which we criticise in present forms of worship as superstition. From one point of view superstition is opposed to religion; from another it is related to it. They must have something in common, yet with a great difference. Superstition is the feeling toward the supernatural as negative, religion the feeling toward the supernatural as positive.

We have here a justification of our second definition of religion as a feeling toward the supernatural. For with any other definition we should have difficulty in finding room for superstition; the two pass into each other so easily, and yet are so distinct, that it is difficult to include them properly in a single definition. True religion is antithetical to superstition, and an antithetical relation implies union, a relation to something held in common. This union exists for superstition and religion in that each is a feeling toward the supernatural.

There are three forms under which the supernatural considered as negative may be recognized: active negativity, negativity of neutrality, and negativity of limitation. The most striking of these is active negativity. It is a destructive force, invading the natural and making war upon it. It is this form which we find more marked in the lowest religions. The savage lives almost wholly in nature. So great is his confidence in it that he thinks it might continue indefinitely if it were not that the supernatural makes

war upon it. Whereas in the higher forms of religion man's trust is in the supernatural, and the natural world is the disturbing element, here the trust is in the natural world, and it is the supernatural which invades. Disease and death are regarded as such invasions of spiritual forces, interfering with nature. In the religion of the Avesta, the demon most hated is he who has possession of the bodies of the dead, the personification of dissolution with all its attendant horrors. To overcome this invading force of the supernatural, resort is had to magic and spells and charms. We find, therefore, that in a certain sense Müller's definition of religion as "the relation to the infinite" is true in the extreme types of religion. It is true, at one extreme, in the ultimate forms of Brahmanism, and it is also true in the lowest forms of religion if we consider the supernatural element which invades the natural world as the infinite negatively interpreted, the anti-finite. It is of course an infinite as formless as the savage's thought of the ocean. It is as though he were to build his

hut on the shore and establish his home there, and then there were to come some day a great tide, higher than usual, which should sweep everything away.

The devil is the ideal of active negativity. We may say that he is the god of superstition. In the words which Goethe puts into the mouth of Mephistopheles, he is "the spirit that always denies." Emerson, in an unpublished lecture, speaking of the negativity of the devil, said that if a profane man wished to strengthen an affirmation he did so by referring to God, "It is so, by God," whereas a negative statement was referred to the devil, "The devil it is !"

" When the devil was sick and like to die,
The devil a monk would be ;
But when the devil got well again,
The devil a monk was he." ¹

Can religion recognize this negativity? Yes, it represents a real relation, a great truth. The supernatural does stand in a negative relation to many parts of life. Even in its highest form there is something of this nega-

¹ Francis Rabelais, " Works," Bk. IV, Ch. XXIV.

tive relation. For in its highest form it is the sense of our ideals, and our ideals are always making war upon the natural, the existing order. "Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet," says Emerson.¹ A thinker introduces an ideal, and an ideal breaks up one's relations to the world about him. Take the ideal of absolute freedom. What is more positive? Yet what a disturbing power this positive ideal may be, witness our civil war! But when a man is doing wrong, we have again a disturbing force. What is the difference? When a positive negative acts, it negates a negation, and an affirmative is the result. Slavery is negative; the ideal of freedom, negating this negative, sets the slave at liberty, and we have an affirmative. The simple negative, on the other hand, results only in a negation.

Does man ever hate God? The question has often been asked, and many theologians have said that he does not when God is seen as he really is. Yet we must say that a man

¹ "Essays," First Series, "Circles."

may see God as he really is, and yet hate him, so long as he sees him only in negative relation to himself. Abstractly it may not be possible for us to have any feeling of hatred toward God; but when he is manifested in such a way as to break up our lives, when collisions come between the natural life and the life led in the thought of God, then there enters the possibility of hatred. It was thus that people asked Jesus to leave them,¹ and that Paul and Silas were accused by the men whose gains they had interfered with.² Only when we come to understand our relation to God in its positive aspect can we fully love him. God is called a "consuming fire," a "jealous God." He is jealous in the sense in which every ideal is jealous of the actual, demanding absolute devotion.

Shall we call it superstition when we hate God because he requires of us something which we are unwilling to do? There are those who can see in the largest manifestation

¹ Matt. viii. 34. Also Luke v. 8.

² Acts xvi.

of love and right only that which opposes them; shall we call this superstition? Yes, it is a superstitious feeling. The facts of religion have been translated into the language of superstition. The fear and dread of the ideal involve an attitude of superstition in regard to it. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Yes, says Hegel, but it is not the end of wisdom.

The second form under which we recognize the supernatural regarded as negative is the negative of neutrality. Here we use the term "negative" just as we do ordinarily in common speech. We say of a man that he has a negative character when we mean that he is without any positive or marked characteristics, and is simply not this and not that, etc. We speak in the same way of negative colors. When in this sense we apply the term "negative" to the divinity, we do not mean that he may not have interests of his own, but that, so far as human interests are concerned, he has no desire either to harm or to bless, he cares nothing about them. Our effort, then, is to make him

care. He has wants of his own, and to win him to our support we will appeal to those wants. If he should be opposed to us, we should try in the same way to remove his hostility; if he should be uncertain, freaky, we should use the same means to win him to a stable friendliness. It is as though we had to deal with a venal judge, who did not care for us, but did care for money, and we could by some bribe sue for his interest in our case. So the Vedic worshippers offer each his soma juice to the divinity, and he whose offering is accepted has gained the favor of the divinity. So in all the history of the world we find warring elements, striving each by prayer or offering to win the help of the supernatural powers, or, as we say, to "get the Lord upon their side." From the highest point of view, the divinity is conceived as still having interests and needs of his own; but our endeavor is, not to win him over to our desires, but to make our desires one with his. We ask, not "Is the Lord upon our side?" but "Are we upon the Lord's side?" This is the difference between such a prayer as that of Jacob

at Bethel¹ and the prayer of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane.²

As we follow the history of religion, we see to what an extent religious worship has been of the superstitious kind which tries to bribe the divinity. Yet we should make a great mistake if we assumed that there was in the religion which thus expressed itself no higher element than the desire to win favor and support for selfish ends. A child, on seeing his father, will run and thrust his hand into the father's pocket to see what gift there is for him, but we do not, therefore, doubt the child's love for his father.

We have in the third place a superstition which is fortuitous, selective, a negativity of limitation. Certain things are recognized as sacred: certain animals, certain places, certain days. There are spots of sacredness; men say, "Lo here!" or "Lo there!" True religion finds the divine presence everywhere; not a sparrow shall "fall on the ground without your Father."³ Not that special times and places may not be observed, but there

¹ Gen. xxviii. 20-22. ² Matt. xxvi. 36-46. ³ Matt. x. 29.

are in all such observances a right use and a wrong use. The day or the place may be sacred in either of two senses; it may be set apart for religious and moral opportunities, or it may be considered sacred in itself; I may go to church feeling that I have now to my credit one good deed more, or I may go because I recognize another opportunity for higher thought and nearer relation with God. The test of the observance is whether the day or the thing set apart casts a shadow on other days and other things, or brightens them; whether it tends to make the rest of life profane, or to make all life more sacred. We must remember, however, that it is better to have one day holy than to have no day at all holy. If one day is holy, the divine power has at least so much foothold in the world, a beginning from which to spread.

We have also to remember that what, from a higher point of view, appears to be superstition may be the husk of true religion. The world cannot reach absolute truth at a bound; it can only take that which for the time being is within its reach. We look

back to the Greek myth, and think it a profanation to conceive the gods in human form; but if we look at it from the point of view of those who in earlier times had represented the divine in the form of a beast or a stone, the conception of the divine in human form marks a great advance. As soon as any form has been outgrown, we see its limitations, but compared with earlier forms it was a gain. The test is whether at any given time that which is worshipped is above the worshipper or below him, whether the worship lifts his nature or degrades it.

There is a popular definition of superstition based on a derivation from *superstare*, which makes superstition a survival, something which stands over or is left beyond its time. The etymology is mistaken, but superstition does take a necessary place in religion, and survives for a time after larger truths have come. In the terms "heathenism" and "paganism," both of which refer to the persistence of older forms in villages and out-of-the-way places after Christianity had been recognized in the cities, we have an illustration of the different aspect

of superstition as something which stands in the way when it has outlived its time. We may notice also, in passing, that narrowness of external form often stands around some positive, absolute element. A neighbor tells me that if I will unite with his church I shall find God. I may indeed find God in this way. Yet my neighbor's attitude must somewhat remind us of the boy who sold tickets of admission to his mother's yard to those who wished to see the eclipse; those who entered may be said to have received their money's worth; they saw what they had paid to see.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUPERNATURAL CONSIDERED AS POSITIVE
— THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS — THE PROG-
RESS FROM THE RELIGION OF SELF-RELATED
FEELING TO THE RELIGION IN WHICH THE
FEELING CENTRES IN GOD

As we pass to the consideration of the supernatural regarded as positive, we must take care that we do not repeat the mistake of Spencer and Schleiermacher. We found them working somewhat arbitrarily, at least in part, making their definitions of religion fit their systems of philosophy. We must try instead to keep close to the facts of religion itself as recognized in the world; for it is better that we should have a very imperfect science of religion than a very perfect science of something which is not religion.

We shall be helped in this if we first bring together the different kinds of feelings which have been recognized as religious, including all

which have some place in religion, even though all may not be essential. We may group them under three general headings. The first group will include all the religious feelings which are self-centred, or, to use a more exact term, self-related : the negative feeling, fear ; the positive feelings, trust, conciliation, gratitude, praise ; and the mediative feelings, submission and reconciliation. In the second group we shall have those feelings whose centre is divided : recognition and dread. And in the third group will be found the feelings which centre in God : first, love and worship ; second, awe and obedience ; and lastly, self-surrender, this self-surrender being either mystical or ethical, the highest surrender possible and not merely submission. We might add to this list ; but we have included most of the feelings which are typical. It should be said, in passing, that the terms used are somewhat forced in certain cases, and that sometimes the expression of the feeling has been used instead of the feeling itself.

The self-centred or self-related feelings are those of the worshipper who seeks his own

good. His relation to the divinity who is the object of his worship is that of expectation of some service, or of recognition of a service which has been performed. The worshipper regards himself as the centre, and appeals to the divinity to help him in the attainment of the special ends which he has at heart, or to deliver him from evils which he wishes to avoid. The first of these self-related feelings is negative, the *fear* of the divinity. It is so prominent in the lower forms of religion that some have concluded that religion originally sprang from fear. This is an exaggeration; yet fear does have a large place in the religion of the savage, to whom death or sickness brings the thought of some interference with the natural order of things on the part of the supernatural beings whom he must propitiate.

Following this first relation there comes the stage in which the worshipper thinks that he has formed such a relation with the divinities that they will help him, and his negative feeling of fear changes to a positive *trust*. The divinity has become the god of his tribe or his nation; or he has made a bargain with

him, and the divinity must keep it ; Indra has drunk the soma juice. If the divinity is indifferent, he will *conciliate* him. If the divinity has given aid, the worshipper will return *gratitude* and *praise*. The term "praise" is often used in the sense of worship, but worship requires a higher view of the divinity than praise. We worship only that which is exalted above us, but that which we praise may be on an equality with us or even on a lower plane ; we praise a servant or a child, or a horse or a dog. The praise which the self-related worshipper gives his god is not for what the divinity is, but for what he has done ; he says, not "How good God is !" but "How good God has been to me !"

Of the mediative feelings the *submission* of the self-related worshipper is the surrender to the inevitable. The world has gone wrong, the divinity has failed to do what the worshipper hoped for ; but the worshipper feels that it is useless for him to strive longer against a power greater than his own, and so he submits, not gladly, but because he must. In the course of the conflict a breach has

opened, but with the submission of the worshipper the breach is closed and *reconciliation* takes place.

The second group, that which includes the feelings whose centre is divided, is psychological rather than historical. It marks the development of the worshipper out of the lower into the higher forms of the religious life. The worshipper begins to see that the divinity has needs of its own to which the worshipper ought to yield; he begins to recognize the rightfulness of the moral and divine law. Yet at the same time he shrinks from obedience to it. He finds himself in the situation which Paul describes: "For not what I would, that do I practise; but what I hate, that I do. . . . For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members."¹

In the third group of feelings God is the centre, and the worshipper not only feels and

¹ Rom. vii. 15, 22-23.

recognizes the supremacy of the divinity, but rejoices in it. *Love* is felt toward him, not for what he has done for the worshipper, but for what he is in himself. *Worship* is rendered, not because he has brought help to the worshipper, but because he is in himself worthy of worship. We have not left absolutely behind us the negative element, for we have *awe*. This awe, however, is not the sort of negative which we call superstition, for it is not a relation toward the supernatural regarded as negative; that which inspires the awe is greater in the mind of the worshipper than the awe. So in a great storm the recognition of the might of the elements produces in us a sense of awe very different from the sense of personal fear. Awe is thus rather a reminiscence of the negative element than its actual presence. It is, or should be, inseparable from the higher religious feelings. It belongs, indeed, not merely to the religious, but to all the higher feelings. In the relation between two friends, for example, if one loses his reverence for the personality of the other, then friendship has lost one of its exalting

and purifying characteristics. The father or mother may feel awe toward the little child. Toward God, if once we have the slightest sense of the eternal, infinite nature of his being, awe must enter always into every feeling, even our tenderest love; when awe appears to be absent, it is as though the flower and bloom of religious feeling had been rubbed off.

Associated with the feeling of awe is the spirit of *obedience*. An external, formal obedience may be found among the self-related feelings. Such obedience, however, is unwilling; it is very different from this spirit of obedience.

Finally we have *self-surrender*. This, again, is different from the submission of the self-related life. Submission, although it may be used in a higher sense, is often used in the sense of mere surrender to force or to necessity. Self-surrender, on the other hand, can be understood only when one gives himself up to something which he feels is worthy of the sacrifice. We see the difference which is implied in the conception of the divinity when we

think of the two interpretations which we may give to the words of the Forty-sixth Psalm, "Be still and know that I am God."¹ On the one hand is the God of might, forcing the submission of his creature, asking him why he should contend in his helplessness with the infinite power; on the other is the God who invites the worshipper to surrender himself to the infinite wisdom and love, which can do for him beyond what he can desire or conceive. Thus the father may say to his child, "I am your father," requiring submission to parental authority, or in the same words may express the love and the wisdom which shall lead the child to surrender himself.

Self-surrender appears in two forms. The first, the mystical, is found in Brahmanism and in the Christianity of the mystics; we see it in Paul, and in Schleiermacher's sense of absolute dependence. In the second, the ethical form, the individual gives himself up, not simply to the spirit of obedience, but to the actual doing of the will of God in whatever direction one is led.

¹ Ps. xlv. 10.

Self-surrender can take place only toward that which represents the self. A man's ideal, that which he earnestly longs to be and tries to be, is more himself than that which he is, just as the plant is much more the reality of the seed than is the seed itself so long as it remains without germinating. There can be, therefore, no self-surrender to the divinity unless the divinity fulfils our own highest ideals, and we can in this sense surrender to our own truest self. Love to God is the recognition that the divinity thus fulfils our ideals.

Can there remain in this highest form of religion any of the self-related feelings? Is it necessary that there should be absolute extinction of all relation to self? Must the man who loves God cease to love himself? Some have held to this as essential to the highest religious life. Yet, if we do not love ourselves, there is a certain blank in our lives; there is one direction in which our own love does not extend; and if we do not rejoice in our own personal relation to God, there is one point in which we have failed to give the love of God full recognition. If, to use the phrase

attributed to a certain religious sect, a man were "willing to be damned for the glory of God," he would simply be willing that the outgoing love of God should come to a stop at that point where he himself was concerned. We know what is good and pleasant only by experience. We cannot understand the pleasure of another if we have none ourselves. If all good and happiness were passed on by every one to some one else, no one would have any. A man stands on a cliff looking out across the sea toward the setting sun, and sees a path of light between himself and the sun; other men stand on either side along the cliff, and each sees in the same way his path of light. It adds to the thought of the glory of the sun that all are thus sharing the same experience; but each could have no conception of the rays which are covering the whole line of coast, if he did not see the special beauty of the ray which connects him individually and personally with the sun. So experience in one's self and for one's self is the key to the comprehension of the experience of others, and to the best method of serving others.

The whole difficulty arises from a confusion of self-love with selfishness. There is always a tendency in men to go to extremes. As the recognition of the immorality of sensual pleasure when carried to lawlessness led to the condemnation of all sensual pleasure, whether legitimate or not, so the evident evil of selfishness has produced the view that all self-regard or self-love is wrong. But the evil of selfishness lies in its exclusiveness and in its claim to have a monopoly of any good or pleasure. If on a cold night we go into a room and take a place before the fire, the act becomes selfish only when some one else is crowded out. In self-love we may thank God for the blessings we have received; it is a very different thing when we thank him because we have received more than others. It is normal for a child to rejoice in his mother's love; the abnormal appears only when the child rejoices because he is loved more than his brothers.

Further, healthy self-assertion is important for others; it becomes a form of altruism. For the development of life in the social order results largely from the mutual resist-

ance of individuals. A man leads a healthy life because he meets with resistance from all sides. If in any direction resistance is withdrawn, there is at once the tendency to abnormal development in that direction. If one of two friends always gives way to the other, he tends to establish in the other a habit of claiming consideration and indulgence. In the same way a mother, by sacrificing herself constantly to her children, may lead them to think that she does not mind sacrifice; they cease to consider her, and become selfish. The rule, "It is more blessed to give than to receive,"¹ must be allowed to work both ways, and another than ourselves be sometimes permitted the greater blessedness.

There are, of course, occasions when self-regard has no place, when one must wholly forget one's self. Under certain conditions, for instance, we recognize a virtue in giving one's life for another. A man may ask in such a case, "Why should I sacrifice myself? Is it anything more than an exchange of

¹ Acts xx. 35.

equal values?" But conditions may be such that lives are no longer to be judged as of equal value. Suppose two men are on a raft at sea, and only one can be saved; one is single, the other has a family; the loss to the world would be greater if the man with the family should drown, because his death would affect a greater number. As between the general of an army and a common soldier, the life of the general becomes more valuable, because upon him depends the conduct of the whole campaign. There are cases where an individual may save a multitude. In all these cases equality no longer exists. It is conceivable, also, that one might give one's life for a worthless person if by the sacrifice the person benefited would be reformed. There may be also a self-sacrifice of discipline. But an unreasoning self-sacrifice is not ennobling; when self is sacrificed it should be for some object, and it is the object which gives worth to the sacrifice. After all is said, the generous mind will not try to draw the line too carefully between selfishness and self-love. Self-love, further-

more, hardly needs to be preached; as a rule it takes care of itself; the danger is of too little self-surrender.

When our friends care more for us than they do for others, we are glad. Why should we not feel a similar joy in the thought that God may love us more than others? The conditions, however, are different. In earthly relations we expect and rightly demand a certain favoritism, a warmth of personal affection, which cannot be given to all alike in the same degree. This is what we mean by friendship. The broader, more general affections, the larger philanthropy and human interest, grow out of this more intense affection of friend for friend, and depend upon it for their highest meaning and value. It is true that in some forms of religion the attempt is made to do away with all special and particular affection, on the ground that it brings with it care and pain and sorrow; but if personal love ceases, we feel that a very essential element of human life is lost. Where there is an equal claim, however, we expect equal love. The child would be justly grieved

if his mother did not care more for him than for the children in the street; but he would also be pained to know that his mother loved him either more or less than she did his brothers. Now, all have an equal claim upon God, and in our conception of the infinite love we can imagine no limitation such as we find in finite relations; the infinite love is inexhaustible, and we rejoice in its universality and not in its selection of ourselves.

The idea of favoritism has indeed held a prominent place in religion; the earlier divinities were tribal or national, and therefore partisan. But as the conception of the divinity becomes broader and higher, no room is found for favoritism. The relation in which God stands toward the sinner is no exception. Even in the family, indignation at wrongdoing and blame do not check affection for the wrong-doer; a light-minded father or mother, it is true, may allow anger to take the place of affection toward a disobedient or wayward child, but the large-hearted parent will never love the child more than at those

times when punishment must be administered. We know that there is danger in carrying anthropomorphic ideas too far into the thought of God ; yet the highest symbol which we have of God's spirit is our own spiritual life, and we cannot conceive of the sinner as in any relation to God other than that of an erring child to a loving father.

Some one may ask, however, how it is possible for the unfortunate and afflicted to believe that God's love is equal. In answering such a question, we have to remind ourselves that various individuals are called for various services. The world offers not so much different degrees of benefit as different kinds of service, and any advantage which one appears to have over another is simply his greater opportunity for usefulness. We do not say that the general is favored above the common soldier because he stands apart from the conflict. The son who is sent to college is not loved above his brothers who are compelled to remain at home ; he has only been selected for a particular sphere of usefulness.

Although any exclusiveness of claim, any

thought of exceptional love, is out of place in the highest conception of religion, yet the consciousness of individual love, the self-assertion which claims for itself only what belongs to it, is right, and gives nobility to life. "He calleth his own sheep by name."¹ Such self-assertion is necessary if there is to be true self-surrender.

"Our wills are ours, to make them thine."²

The feelings which in the lower forms of religious life were only self-related, are now in the highest forms transfigured, leaving behind all selfishness. A man comes to give thanks, not because he has been particularly favored in this or that, apart from others, or above others, but simply out of joy in the consciousness that he is blessed, and that the whole world is partaker in the divine blessing. His appreciation of what he has himself received gives warmth and reality to his thanksgiving, while his own experience makes possible for him a sympathy with the experience of the race.

The transition from the self-related feelings

¹ John x. 3. ² Tennyson, "In Memoriam," the prologue.

to the feelings which centre in God is the most important change which can take place in religion. Some have considered the passage from polytheism to monotheism most important. They are right so far as religious thought is concerned ; but feeling is more fundamental in religion than thought. The individual may pass from polytheistic to monotheistic belief, and remain all the time in the lowest stage of religious feeling, as self-related at the last in his attitude toward the one God as he was at the outset toward the various divinities of his earlier belief. It is true that the monotheistic view is more favorable to the development of unselfish feeling than polytheism, in so far as it leads to the thought that all men are the children of one infinite being, and so promotes a fraternal feeling among men toward one another. Community of religious belief has done much to consolidate tribes and peoples, and also to intensify religious feeling among them. This, however, does not always hold true ; for, as I have said, the individual worshipper may regard the one God only in relation to his own interests ; the children in

a family should naturally love one another more because of their common parentage, but one or another of them may look upon the father or mother only in relation to himself.

Comte argues¹ that, as religion develops from fetichism to polytheism, and from polytheism to monotheism, it becomes less intense and personal. The fetich worshipper finds his divinity near at hand, he has close contact with him. The change to polytheism is a process of generalization, the objects of worship are classified, and it is no longer this or that particular thing which is worshipped, but this or that kind of thing ; Apollo is not so near to the worshipper as was the sun. In monotheism the process of abstraction is carried still farther, and the object of worship is made yet more remote ; and the more abstract and remote the conception of the divinity, the less intense and real is the relation of the worshipper toward him. Thus the passage from fetichism to monotheism, according to Comte, marks the decline of religion. Comte

¹ Auguste Comte, "Positive Philosophy," translated by Harriet Martineau, Vol. II, Bk. VI.

is right in so far as he emphasizes feeling rather than any form of thought in tracing the development of religion, and his whole argument is plausible ; but the conclusion which he reaches is not inevitable. The monotheistic conception may be abstract, and yet the worshipper may have a sense of close relation to the divinity more vital than that of the fetich worshipper. The fetich is external only to the worshipper, something outside of and over against him. The infinite divinity is not only without but within ; the worshipper lives and moves and has his being in him ; he is all-pervading and all-upholding. Here is an intimacy which fetichism cannot give.

The change from self-related feeling to God-centred feeling may explain in part the apparent decline in the interest which the great mass of people take in religion. Just so far as the people who regard themselves as the chief centre of interest are more numerous than those who are willing to give themselves up for larger interests, a God-centred religion must appeal to a smaller number than one which is self-regarding. In church-going,

for example, a great influence is brought to bear when the worshipper thinks that his attendance is noted by the divinity, and that he may, as it were, gain a good mark by regular attendance ; the higher conception of church-going, as an opportunity for spiritual growth and inspiration, appeals to a smaller number. Further, in self-related religion, the divinity is more prominent, so far as the attitude of the worshipper is concerned, than in the God-centred, because in the self-related religion the worshipper is trying to influence the divinity to favor him. He thinks of the divinity as entering into a bargain with him. "Serve me," the divinity appears to him to say, "and I will bless you." In the religion which is God-centred, the word of the divinity is, "Go, do my will ; serve your fellows." The movement is toward the world. On a clear winter evening we say, "How beautiful the stars are !" On a bright, sunny day we say, not "How beautiful is the sun !" but "How beautiful is the world !" The stars reveal themselves ; the sun reveals the whole world to us. Not that we lose relation toward God in see-

ing more fully the relation toward those about us. If relation to God were absent, we might have a philanthropy, but we should no longer have religion. We must remember that our service to man is the outcome of our relation to God, and that the two elements cannot be separated without loss.

We speak of a decline in religious interest, and we see how it is that the higher forms of religious feeling may appeal to a smaller number. It would not be true, however, to say that there is less religion in the world than formerly. There is more true religion in half an hour's questioning: "What wilt thou have me to do?" than in a whole lifetime of asking: "What wilt thou do for me?"

CHAPTER IX

THE CONTENT OF THE SUPERNATURAL — THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON — TRUTH, GOODNESS, AND BEAUTY AS IMPLIED IN THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS — INSTINCT AND REASON

As we compare the self-related feelings with those which centre in God, we find this great difference, that the higher feelings imply a certain content in the divinity which is not similarly involved in the lower feelings. The divinity is not a mere abstract form, which we may use if we will, but a being with a place and will of his own, independent of our personalities, worshipped by us because he is in himself lovable, trusted because he is worthy of trust. The relation is no longer between an individual worshipper and an individual divinity, but between the individual worshipper and the absolutely worshipful, trustworthy, and lovable.

What is the nature of this content? Our minds and hearts are full of varied thoughts and experiences. It seems impossible to classify them. We find, however, a classification already made. It comes, handed down to us, as the result of the thought of the ages. According to this classification, the content of the divinity is found in the three ideas of the reason — truth, goodness, and beauty. Truth we use here in the sense of unity; we shall see the justification of this use later. In speaking of these ideas of the reason, we often consider them objectively as well as subjectively, referring not only to the ideas themselves, but also to the realities which correspond to the ideas. For example, I mean by unity not only my own thought of unity, but also the great fact which I recognize as corresponding to my thought.

What, then, is the relation between the ideas of the reason and the highest forms of the religious feeling? We may make our examination in either of two ways. First, we may begin with the religious feelings themselves, and ask whether they imply the ideas of the

reason ; and, second, we may begin with the ideas of the reason and ask whether they would in themselves give rise to the religious feelings. In contrast with the concrete feelings which we have just been considering, we may call the feelings toward truth, goodness, and beauty free religious feelings, using the term "free" in the sense in which the chemist uses it when he speaks of free oxygen, oxygen, that is, which is not combined with anything else. The feelings toward truth, goodness and beauty are of the nature of religion, they have a certain religiosity ; but when they exist apart we hesitate to speak of them as "religious." The relation of the philosopher to the unity of the universe which he is seeking is not in itself religion ; it is of the same sort with the feeling of the poet or the artist toward beauty, or of the philanthropist toward charity or duty. These feelings become religious as they are combined with others, when to the thought of truth or goodness or beauty is joined the thought of the supernatural. Religion is the feeling toward the Absolute Being in whom are united truth and goodness and beauty.

Do the religious feelings, then, the concrete religious feelings, imply the ideas of the reason? Take the feeling of trust. In the ordinary use of the term, when we say that we trust a person, we imply that we find in him first of all a certain degree of power, physical or intellectual or moral, as the case may be; there is no trust or reliance unless we believe that the person whom we trust has the strength to support us. We imply also his good will, his disposition to help us, and also the continuance, the stability, of this favorable disposition. Now, when we come to the thought of *absolute* reliance, what is involved? We have here the very heart of faith in one of its aspects. Absolute reliance requires in the person trusted not only the power to help, but unvarying, absolute stability; there must be no change from moment to moment. Further, there must be no power in the universe strong enough to cause disturbance. This means that there must be in the universe nothing foreign to the power which we trust. For if there were anything foreign to it, how could we be sure in advance that this foreign element might not

overcome it? In the earlier mythologies there was trust, but not absolute trust; the divinities which others worshipped might be stronger; the gods had their battles as well as men, and one god or another might be defeated; the confidence in the divinity was like that in an army or a general, and as easily overthrown. The object of absolute trust must be that upon which all things depend, the unity of the universe. Further, not only must there be unity in the object of worship, but, as has been already implied, this unity must include the worshipper; the worshipper must be one with the absolute power. The child has a trust in his father beyond that which he has in another, because in some way he feels that his father and he are one. The saying, "Blood is thicker than water," expresses a crude but instinctive trust in kindred blood which typifies broadly the great spiritual unity beneath it. Just as we trust those who are related to us as we cannot so readily trust others, so the reliance of the worshipper is deeper as he feels himself one with the object of his worship. "In him we live and move and have our being."¹

¹ Acts xvii. 28.

Trust thus implies unity in the object of worship, unity in time and in fact, and unity of the worshipper with the object of worship. It must imply goodness also. We can rely upon the forces of nature, so far as regards their permanence ; but we cannot rely upon them to do us good. "Fire is a good servant, but a hard master." The forces of nature may help, or they may destroy. If trust is to be complete, there must be absolute goodness in the object toward which it is directed.

What is implied in love? In human relations there is in it always something indescribable. The lover is asked what it is in his mistress which attracts him, and the picture which he draws is found by another true also of his own beloved. There enters the personal element which cannot be described, by which one appears beautiful and another not. The element of contrast also has its part, the flaw perhaps which gives the good qualities added value, and breaks up what might have seemed a monotony in perfection. Yet, however complex and intangible love may be, we find the three ideas of the reason essential to it. As

the thought of unity entered to deepen the trust between the child and its parent, so in the love of the mother for the child, it is the thought of the mother that her child is part of herself which gives to her love its peculiar strength, and makes it the type of love. Something of this sense of unity is found in all love; we read in romances of the "exchange of hearts"; the centre of the lover's being is in the heart of the beloved.

Goodness and beauty, too, must be assumed in the object of love. No one would love another whom he regarded as essentially and fundamentally bad; the goodness may be obscured, but love believes that at least the germ, the possibility of it, is there. Often the object of love is made the embodiment of the lover's ideals, and sympathy recognizes unfulfilled possibilities of the nature. The mother clings to her son whom others have abandoned; the wife still believes in her vicious husband if only because he once appeared worthy of her. The beauty required by love is not necessarily physical, but rather spiritual beauty, grace of character, that which is

natural. Grace does not take the place of goodness, though it is hard to believe that it does not represent goodness, hard even, sometimes, to realize that mere physical beauty does not represent goodness. Beauty of character and goodness are akin, but there is an element in beauty different from goodness. A man may have a strong sense of duty, he may always do what he believes he ought to do, and yet he may lack the grace of character which calls forth love ; goodness is often hard and angular and conscious. But grace, naturalness, even in those who may be otherwise less worthy, calls forth answering affection.

It is this element of naturalness or grace or beauty which first of all explains the affection so often given to plants. There enters also many times a certain power of personification which clothes the object of the affections with ideal qualities, and sometimes, too, the beauty of the outer world symbolizes and embodies certain aspects of divine perfection ; their life is in some way a representation of life itself. Thus some thought of unity and of goodness as well as of beauty underlies these affections also.

It is hardly necessary to dwell long on the thought of worship; for it is obvious that worship is full and complete in proportion as it involves all three ideas of the reason. In the religion of the Upanishads the worshipper recognizes only the first idea. In the Mazdean religion goodness is recognized, but not unity. The Greek thought emphasizes beauty. In each case worship is incomplete. In higher forms of worship we find included all the qualities which call forth reverence. There must be goodness; for power alone, though it may be admired or feared, is not revered. There must be supremacy, also; in supremacy are implied first unity and then perfection, and perfection adds the element of beauty, the "glory of God."

At this point we have to ask whether our table of the religious feelings is complete. Should not the sense of sin, and repentance, be added to the list? We may include them among the feelings of the third class, those which centre in God; but they seem to be secondary, a result of the primary feelings. If they are to be included, it is easy to see

that they involve recognition of the ideas of the reason. Sin in its deepest sense refers rather to God than to man. It implies a recognition of divine holiness and unity from which the sinner feels himself separated and cut off. It is the antithesis of self-surrender, the refusal to surrender one's self; the sinner maintains his self-relation instead of entering into relation with God. To surrender one's self implies necessarily the recognition of the ideals to which the life gives itself. It is with self-surrender as with trust. There must be not only unity in that to which we surrender ourselves considered in itself, but unity between it and ourselves. As we have seen already, we may *submit* to that which is foreign to and apart from ourselves, but we can surrender ourselves only to that which fulfils our own highest ideals and is thus in a certain sense our own highest self. The ideal which we hold before us, and to which we are to give ourselves, belongs to our own nature. We may not be conscious of this. The ideal may be foreign to the life actually lived, so that the identity of the relationship may be

obscured ; yet even here the attraction toward the ideal shows the kinship with it of the actual self. The idea of goodness also is implied in the highest self-surrender, filling out the conception of that to which one gives oneself. In this highest form of self-surrender the life is not conscious of the unity in which it stands with the ideal, it is not conscious that it is surrendering itself. Its surrender is that of love.

I have said that there were two methods by which we might examine the relation between the ideas of the reason and the higher forms of religious feeling. Thus far we have followed the first of these methods ; beginning with the concrete feelings themselves, we have looked to see whether they implied the ideas of the reason. We have now to take up the second and more essential method of examination, and to ask whether the ideas of the reason in themselves give rise to the religious feelings. In doing this we shall find it helpful, first of all, to have a clear idea of the part which instinct¹ has in life. We speak of

¹ See also C. C. Everett, "Essays Theological and Literary."

man as a bundle of instincts, and we are apt to think of these instincts as more or less like so many quills of a porcupine, ready to be thrust out or let go. In reality, however, instincts are tendencies to action, tendencies of individual life to manifest itself in one way or another. When I spoke of the primacy of feeling I had in mind its primacy in manifestation rather than in fact. Behind feeling there exists something which manifests itself in feeling, and this inner self is the instinctive self. Why do we take satisfaction in doing anything? It can be only because there is a natural tendency, an instinct, to perform the act. We like to take exercise, to eat when we are hungry, because these desires are instinctive. Of course these instincts may be developed; the savage's love of beads may become the æsthetic appreciation of a Raphael. Yet "nature is made better by no means but nature made these means." Development is along the line of instinct.

In the manifestation of instinct the first stage is impulse, the last and highest stage is the ideal. We see a case of suffering, and

our instinct is to relieve it ; but we have also an instinctive desire to avoid it as well as to relieve it. We sometimes speak of the altruistic impulse as built upon the selfish impulse ; but in reality the one is as natural as the other, just as an atom exercises attraction as naturally as repulsion, or *vice versa*. In the earliest forms of life, in animals, in the savage, in a child, the self-regarding instincts may be the more powerful ; but to a certain extent the other instincts are there, and their manifestation is as natural, when it occurs, as the manifestation of the self-regarding instincts. Sometimes it appears as though by education we changed the nature ; but in such cases what we see is only the result of the development of instincts along lines in which without such training they might not have been developed. Thus a dog may be taught to do things which seem foreign to his nature ; but what he does is after all based upon his instincts, social, imitative, and affectionate ; the path by which the result is reached is the instinctive nature of the animal himself.

We do not desire a thing because it is

desirable ; it becomes desirable as we desire it, as it meets some instinctive demand of our nature. Water is desirable because it meets one of our needs ; when we are not thirsty we do not desire it. This may seem to unsettle all the fundamental relations of things, and make highest and lowest alike dependent entirely upon the point of view of the individual. This, according to Nietzsche,¹ is just what does happen. Man, he says, is a creature of instincts, and these instincts practically make up his life. He has instincts of belief beyond which he cannot pass. What, then, becomes of the Absolute? — the Absolute Being or the Absolute Truth? There can be no real proof of anything, and each believes simply what it is his nature to believe. Nietzsche's premises we may accept heartily, but his conclusion is not warranted. The confusion in which his reasoning seems to leave matters of belief and thought disappears when

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, "Works," edited by Alexander Tille ; also "Jenseits von Gut und Böse." See article by C. C. Everett in the *New World*, Vol. VII, "Beyond Good and Evil," reprinted in "Essays Theological and Literary."

we look more closely. It is idle to say that something is simply our belief, but that we do not know whether or not it is true; if we cannot help believing we cannot really raise the question whether what we believe is true or not.

We have instincts of belief as well as instincts of action. At one time instinct may prompt me to do one thing, at another time, another. Now, when a man has formed an ideal of life, when, we will say, he has come to feel that it is his duty to do all that he can for the betterment of the world, or, higher still, when the sense of duty has become in him a desire, a sense of privilege, then such a man has reached a stage far in advance of the impulses of his earliest stage. Between those impulses and the high ideal is the realm of conscious reason. We compare instincts, intelligence gives its aid, and what were at first blind impulses become ideals. We cannot, however, give account of the ideal any more than we could give account of the first impulse. If we ask ourselves why we want to make people better or happier, there is no in-

telligent answer. We may say, "Because it is better for them." But why is it better, and why do we wish it to be better? No matter how far we push the question, we come at last to something which is final, and to which there is and can be no answer.

Here we have to recognize two uses of the word "reason." On the one hand, it may refer to the logical process of thought by which certain results are reached. On the other hand, we use it with reference to that which appears to us to be reasonable or unreasonable. When we say that a man does what is reasonable, we do not mean that his action is the result of any conscious process by which he has argued everything to a conclusion, but simply that he has done that which conforms to reason, that is, to the ideal of life. Often that which is reasonable may contradict that which has been reasoned. A man in solving a problem obtains a wrong result; he may not find any flaw in the process by which he has reached it, yet he distrusts the result because it is not reasonable. Reasoning is built upon reason. As we act instinctively, so we believe

instinctively. We recognize that nothing can be absolutely proved. We have certain tendencies to believe. All that reasoning can accomplish is to bring back our reason to some ground of trust. There can be no valid chain of reasoning which is not attached to some instinctive belief, something which we take for granted. This something may be superficial or it may be fundamental; it may be some prejudice, some hereditary or current belief, or again, it may be some ultimate fact of life.

Reasoning consists in connecting a given proposition with what we actually believe. Every argument involves two kinds of assumption, that is, things which cannot be proved: first, the relation between the major and the minor premise; and second, the relation between the premises and the conclusion. One is the connection, the other the ultimate basis, of the proposition. The relation between the premises is taken for granted or is seen directly. We say in such a case that we see that it is true; but this is not a primary perception, it is only the absolute certainty of a relation, and

that is always secondary. We have a feeling of absolute certainty ; then the intellect and the feeling are united.

Reason as distinct from reasoning is the final point in which we rest. Reasonableness, however, may be of various kinds. It may conform either to previous experience or to fundamental ideas of the reason. This may appear to take away the basis of certainty. But, as I have said in referring to Nietzsche's theory, what we cannot help believing it is idle to talk about. Can we doubt the law of contradiction? We simply cannot believe that one thing can be where another thing is in the same time and in the same sense. There are different layers of certainty or belief. Some have come from prejudice, some are the common beliefs in which we have been educated. Certain things are taken for granted which become the basis of our reasoning. Behind these beliefs are the ideas of the reason. This may seem to introduce laxity into our thought, but it is by this method that the world moves. If every one had to begin for himself and settle everything afresh, the world would make little

progress. There is, however, a great body of beliefs in which we are educated, which is the bequest of the ages. This body of beliefs gives us more truth than we should have without it. It does not follow, of course, that we are to take for granted all that we hear or all the beliefs that we find. Some we cannot help taking for granted, and some we cannot help questioning; but those which we question form only a small portion of what has come to us. Our most revolutionary thinkers have touched very little of the great body of beliefs which men take for granted. Christianity seemed a revolution; but the thoughts and customs of the world closed in upon it, and although a new and mighty element was introduced, only a small fraction of the whole ideal content of the world was changed.

As the reason is the final point in which we rest, so it is the ultimate basis of belief. Men speak sometimes of innate ideas as though they were in some way tacked on to men at the outset, a sort of tag. Some philosophers assume them, Locke and others deny them. In fact, however, innate ideas come to us through

instinct. We cannot help thinking or believing certain things. We recognize thus as innate the three ideas of the reason—truth, goodness, and beauty. Later, we shall find that, of these, goodness and beauty are really manifestations of truth, so that ultimately we have this one innate idea, the first idea of the reason.

CHAPTER X

THE IDEAS OF THE REASON AS SUPERNATURAL — THE BELIEF IN UNITY INSTINCTIVE: CONSIDERATION OF THE THEORIES OF HUME AND MILL — THE SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF THE MORAL LAW

WE have found that religion is the feeling toward the supernatural. We have also found that the ideas of the reason are involved in religious feeling. These ideas, then, should partake of the supernatural; it should appear that they are not the result of experience, but underlie experience and make it possible. Take the first idea of the reason, truth. I have said that truth is synonymous with unity. How shall we justify this statement? We must ask ourselves what we mean by truth. We use the word in various significations. We say that a proposition is true when it corresponds to external facts. Subjectively, truth is harmony between my

thought and what is going on outside. We have the objective use also; we speak of a true man, one who conforms to the ideal of a man. Again, we hear a story, and we wish to know the truth of it. We talk about seeking the truth; what is it that we seek? Here is a fact; the truth cannot be simply the existence of this particular phenomenon; the truth must be the relation of this object or phenomenon to other objects and phenomena.

When we first see an object it seems to stand apart, and what we try to do is to bring it into relation with other objects. Every one lives in relation to an organized world of thought. Our first effort with something which is new to us is to bring it into relation with our world of previous experience, and anything which we cannot bring into such relation either startles us or else makes no impression at all. We accept nothing for which there is not some niche ready in our minds. If we knew the absolute truth, we should see the universe as a great organic whole, the manifestation of a principle in and through which all things exist.

“ Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies; —
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower — but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.” ¹

The idea of truth thus shows itself as the ideal unity in and through which all things exist, and it is obvious that there is no forcing of terms in our use of truth and unity as synonymous.

Subjectively, an idea which is true stands in connection with some external fact. Truth here implies unity. If we say that a thought is not true, does it then stand alone? No, we unite it with the psychological world; every error as well as every truth has its place in the psychological development of the individual; it is nothing isolated; and if we could see all as it is, we should see this psychological world related in some way to the rest of the world. So far as objective truth is concerned, we find it in our definition of the supernatural. Nature we found to be the

¹ Alfred Tennyson, “ Miscellaneous Poems,” “ Flower in the Crannied Wall.”

world considered as a composite whole. The supernatural, while it might be the power which interfered with the mutual relations of the elements in this composite whole, was also the unity in and through which all the elements had their existence.

The idea of unity is spontaneous in the mind itself. This appears under two aspects. First, *a priori*, we find the idea of unity implicit in all intellectual activity. Here we come back to instinct. By instinct, as we have seen, the organism acts as it would if it knew something which it does not know. Thought at first is purely instinctive. We have an instinct to think just as the animal has an instinct to react. This instinct to think is the primary response of man to his environment. Now, thinking is the process of forming concepts, and every concept involves two aspects, a universal and a limiting element; every concept is a limiting universal;¹ an absolute universal cannot be conceived. The process of thought consists in

¹ C. C. Everett, "Science of Thought," Bk. II, "Conception and Terms."

bringing the object of thought into relation with something else; no element can be conceived by itself. Whenever we wish to understand something new, we bring the new object into relation with the world of thought and experience which is already ours. This we call apperception. It is, as I have just said, instinctive at first. We make no statement in regard to unity; we simply assume, as soon as we ask the question how or why, as soon as we begin to think, that there is a relation between each new element and our intellectual or experiential world. The savage makes no universal statement; but he assumes the fact that every experience belongs to the world in which he lives. He does not say explicitly with Tennyson that if he wholly understood the flower in the crannied wall he would know God; but he does assume unity in every direction. His assumption that a particular object or element has its place in the world carries with it implicitly the fact that everything has this relation. He is like the farmer who said he never wanted much land, but always did want the

land next to his. So the savage desires to annex one thing after another to his intellectual world, and thus begins a progress into the infinite. He thinks exactly as he would if he could see all and know that there was absolute unity; he does not know, but he acts as though he knew. This, then, is what we mean by saying that the idea of unity is instinctive, implicit, in all human thought.

When we attempt to reach the idea of unity by an *a posteriori* process we find ourselves involved in a contradiction. Induction rests upon or implies the idea of unity; but the idea of unity, the thought of the world as an organic whole, can never be reached by any inductive process. We say, after a few trials, that gold is heavier than water; we trust our induction because of our faith in the unity of things. We apply the law of gravitation to the universe; we have studied only a few worlds; we leap from a generalization to a universal assumption. It is not the process of induction which has given us knowledge of the unity of things; it is once more the underlying faith in that unity which has made

possible this leap to the universal assumption. Hume holds that if we knew all that ever has happened in the world, the regularity and uniformity of events, their sequence, and all the phenomena connected with them, we should still have no logical reason for a belief in their continuance even for the next minute. Induction cannot go beyond generalization, and generalization, strictly speaking, is the recognition of uniformity within the range of actual experience.¹ The atmosphere in which we pass from generalizations to universal affirmations, the atmosphere which supports the wings of our thought as it soars beyond the world of experience, is this instinctive faith in the unity of things.

All induction by which science arrives at the idea of the unity of the world depends upon an unconscious assumption of that unity. Further, the most absolute recognition of the unity of the world comes before the beginnings of scientific induction. In the Upanishads, the earliest expression of philosophic thought,

¹ C. C. Everett, "Science of Thought," Bk. II, B, b, "Generalization."

we find the conception of the absolute unity of the world ; yet all these facts on which science now affirms that unity depends are disregarded, the whole world of what we call reality is denied, and unity is reached without any external basis for belief. We find essentially the same position, similarly gained, in the Eleatic philosophy ; again the manifold is denied, and unity is held to be the one absolute reality. The great service rendered by the development of science is that it tends to bring to consciousness this idea of the unity of the world, so that it can be expressed in general propositions and receive popular recognition.

To see how easily one may blunder here, we have only to consider the discussion between Tyndall and Mozley in regard to the credibility of miracles.¹ In this discussion Mozley takes the ground that the argument against a miracle, that it does not conform to the experience of the world, is not conclusive ; experience, he holds, furnishes no logical ground

¹ James B. Mozley, "On Miracles" ; John Tyndall, "Fragments of Science for Unscientific People," p. 57.

for believing anything, and if a miracle does not correspond to experience, that is no reason for disbelieving it. Tyndall replies that by trusting experience much has been discovered, and appeals to experience to show that inference from experience is rational. Tyndall falls into a curious logical circle in thus attempting to make experience indorse, so to speak, its own note ; and we are so much in the habit of trusting experience ourselves that we do not easily recognize the fallacy in his argument. Mozley also reasons in a circle ; the miracles are authenticated, he says, and thus he uses evidence as a basis for belief. But if we cannot trust to experience, we cannot any more trust to evidence. Practically, Mozley was wrong, and Tyndall was right. There is no objection to our trusting experience. This, however, is not because experience of the past in itself warrants assumption for the future, but because underlying all our thinking is the idea of unity, and one form of this conception of unity appears in the assumption which we make, that there can be no violent break in experience by which one epoch

of the world should have no connection with another.

In speaking of the process of induction as related to the thought of unity, I have referred to the position taken by Hume. The study of Hume is good for the correction of many assumptions of the present time. Writing clearly and honestly, he undertakes to construct a philosophy which shall take no account of ideal elements, but base itself wholly upon the understanding. He finds two elements in thought: impressions, which are the direct relation of the individual to the external world through the feelings and the senses; and ideas, which are the abstractions of these impressions. Impressions are more distinct than ideas; the sight of a tree is more distinct than the thought of a tree. We must not be misled by the term "impression"; as used by Hume it represents, not simply the action of something upon the mind from without, but the fact of perception. Hume, then, recognizes these two elements in thought, and these alone, and then insists that there is nothing in the realm of ideas which does not come

from the world of impressions. Thus he constructs the world without the ideas of the reason. Ideas are faint images; complex ideas are made out of single ideas. What difference is there, we may ask, according to this position, between that which we believe, and that which we do not believe? Belief, Hume answers,¹ is the conception of an object more lively, more forcible, more vivid, than the imagination alone can attain. This vividness of conception results from association. We associate A with B so often that when A is seen B is suggested so strongly that we have the condition of belief; without any abstract theory in regard to it, the burned child dreads the fire. Vividness of conception is thus not merely the cause of belief, but in itself constitutes belief.

But are there not cases where that which we believe is less vivid than what we disbelieve? Our belief that the earth revolves around the sun is not so vivid as the apparent fact that the sun sinks below the western horizon; yet we brush away the vividness of the sunset, and

¹ "Works," Vol. IV, p. 56.

believe that which we have not experienced, that of which we have merely heard or read. Often, too, where we have a vivid impression that something has occurred, and then find that the occurrence did not take place, with the abandonment of our belief the vividness of the impression also passes. So far from belief depending upon vividness, vividness depends rather upon belief.

All this shows that belief is something more than the vividness of an impression; but what it is we cannot say. We can say, however, what we mean by it. We mean the recognition of the object of belief as having its place in the great, united whole. No external test of belief or unbelief can be found. We recognize belief as we recognize any other inner element of the mind.

According to Hume, once more, our belief in the law of causation is founded on habit. Causation, he says, is simply unvarying sequence. B so regularly follows A that when A occurs we look necessarily for B, and if B does not occur as we expect, it is because some other element has interfered. But one objects

that there are so many cases of invariable sequence where no causation can be recognized. Thus day follows night, and night day, but no one supposes that either is the cause of the other. Mill¹ here adds a word. The term "unconditional," he says, should be added. Unconditional sequence is causation. The day does not follow the night unconditionally; the sun must rise, for instance. But as soon as a condition is shown we distinguish between that which is cause and that which is not cause.

If we accept Hume's idea of belief, that it is vividness of conception, and that belief in causation is the result of association, neither the objection nor Mill's "unconditional sequence" meets the case. According to Hume, day and night should be regarded as the cause one of the other; they give the association of ideas, the invariable sequence, which with Hume stands for causation. What he means by causation, however, is not what we mean by it. We do not mean a simple sequence, an external relation. If this were all, then we should have no reality of connection between the past and

¹ "Logic," p. 203.

the present, no real union between past, present, and future, no continuity in the world; we should have no more relation between things than is found in a heap of sand. What we mean by causation is that there is some inner relation between what we call cause and what we call effect, that the present is the product of the past because of an inner bond; that the world has unity so that nothing in it exists by itself and for itself. Causation is a form under which we recognize again the unity of the world, a unity underlying all the processes of our thought, and not the result of any of them. We seek for a cause for everything. We may admit a formal freedom of the will; yet we seek for the cause of the man's action. We do not ask, "Is the savage, or am I, conscious of a belief in the unity of the world?" but, "Does he or do I manifest such a belief in daily life?" And every time that we seek for a cause, faith in the unity of the world is manifested.

According to Mill,¹ belief in the unity of the world was first reached by reasoning, the

¹ "Logic," pp. 339, 184.

process of induction, and then the belief thus reached was used in turn as a basis for further reasoning, the process of deduction. But I have tried to make it clear that instead of being the result of induction, this belief is the basis of all induction. The first idea of the reason is not reached either by induction or by deduction. It is supernatural. It is that in which the natural, the composite world, lives and moves and has its being.

Ultimate truth cannot be proved. What reason have we, then, for believing in a unity which cannot be proved by induction? The only answer is that we cannot help believing in it. We cannot think of causation without thinking of unity, we cannot make large generalizations without going beyond them to universal assumptions. We receive a new thought, and we must at once bring it into relation with all our former experience. But no chain can support anything unless it is attached to something; an endless chain of reasoning is powerless, and we cannot help recognizing unity as that to which all reasoning ultimately attaches itself. If it is said

that we cannot believe it because we cannot prove it, then we must face this situation, that we cannot get on without believing it, because it is involved in our every thought.

In early religion we meet phenomena which seem at first to exclude the idea of the unity of the world. In place of the universality of law we find the spontaneity of spiritual activities. The savage, in case of sickness, asks not *what* has caused it, the modern question, but *who* has caused it, what witch, what enemy, what ghost. Thus the idea of unity seems broken up. As we look more closely, however, we find still the affirmation of unity, only under a different form. One type of unity is that of the spiritual life. Now no more striking recognition of this unity is found than that which is manifested in the primitive religions. The savage understands the motives which appeal to his own will, and by a great generalization he assumes that what takes place in his own consciousness is the type of that which happens outside of him and everywhere. This is as great a step, as bold and as real, as that

which Schopenhauer takes when he reasons from the consciousness of his own will to the thought of the universal will. The physical type of unity recognized by modern science is the universality of physical law. Science holds that until this was shown there was no recognition of unity. Yet in a sense the view of the savage was more comprehensive than that of the modern scientist. For the savage could find a place for all that occurred in the world, he had no difficulty in understanding the world as controlled; but materialistic science finds little or no place for spiritual phenomena. Material science, therefore, has no right to say that before its day the unity of the world was not recognized.

There is a higher type of unity in which the results of both these types are united. In the early spiritual life there was much caprice. This higher type manifests the same majesty and order that are shown in the physical type. All caprice is eliminated, and yet the unity is spiritual. We have a spiritual unity with the sublime orderliness

of the physical world, but embracing the physical world within itself. This is the unity of monotheistic religion when it reaches its highest development. The caprice which was apparent in the lower divinities would result naturally from the limited nature of those divinities, just as the limited nature of a man makes him capricious. Given the Absolute Spirit, and the element of caprice as naturally and necessarily disappears.

This highest spiritual unity manifests itself under two aspects: first, externally, as the creator of the world; and secondly, and more profoundly, when it is conceived as immanent in the world. I have already spoken of this immanent spiritual unity. We find it manifested in religious mysticism. This mysticism, when normal, consists in the recognition of a certain community between the individual and the universe, between the finite spirit and the infinite spirit. It is manifested most profoundly in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which implies the interpenetration of the individual by the absolute spirit. In its abnormal form mysticism falls easily into

pantheism. God is absorbed into the universe. The universal spirit has no consciousness, and, strictly speaking, human individuality is lost. Unity becomes exclusive, and the understanding has no place. In such abnormal mysticism the individual sometimes thinks it unnecessary to follow the laws of thought; he believes that he has direct intuitions of the truth. Conceiving himself to be a manifestation of the universal life, he thinks that he can arrive at the structure of the universe, as truth in general, by consciousness. But this is lawless thought, dreaming and not reasoning, the work of the fanciful mind. If the man is a man of genius, there will be, it is true, flashes of valuable thought, and some of the mystics of this sort have shown marvellous insight into spiritual things. Many of their intuitions are of real consequence. Jacob Böhme,¹ for example, is regarded by Hegel as holding an important place in the religious world.

We do not always distinguish as we ought

¹ Jacob Böhme, 1575-1624, "Aurora," "Der Weg zu Christo," etc.

between mysticism and pantheism. In the words themselves there is no reason why they should not carry the same meaning, just as there is no reason why deism and theism should not mean the same; only they do not. In mysticism is implied both the immanence and the transcendence of the divine being in the universe; in pantheism only the immanence. We use the term "transcendence" here as we should use it in speaking of the transcendence of the soul over the body. The life of a tree exhausts itself in the life of the tree; in man there is a life which is not exhausted in the life of the body. The life of the tree may represent the pantheistic view of the life of the universe, whereas the transcending consciousness in the life of the man may represent the mystic view of the conscious divine life of the universe. Or, to use the illustration of the tree in another way, if the leaves could be conscious of their relation to the tree, they would be to that extent mystics.

The first idea of the reason is incomplete alone. It is formal, positively formal, and lacks

content. Truth, or unity, is supernatural, it is over against the natural world; but nothing is affirmed of it, it needs a more definite content. We shall reach this in part as we pass to the second idea of the reason, goodness. Is this also supernatural? Yes, and under certain aspects it represents the supernatural in its sternest form. It appears both as negative and as positive. In the same way in which the savage feels that his little life is broken up by the power of the supernatural, so the moral law strikes into the relations of our life with an interference which, when really felt, admits no compromise. If the principle of duty is supreme in a man, nothing else has any value in comparison. No wars are so bloody as those fought for some principle of ethics or of faith. Nations and individuals alike feel the overturning and compelling force of the moral law. The story of Mendelssohn is a type of what takes place again and again. Here is a man living where he desires to live, with the various advantages which he covets for himself and for his family; but he is receiving a salary

from the government which he is doing nothing to earn; he feels that this is wrong, and because of the sense of duty he makes up his mind to leave the place where he would like to remain, and go where he does not want to go.

Some men fail to recognize this imperative sternness of the moral law until they have offended against it. It is thus that men, who have continued in wrong-doing so long as they came into no collision with this force of goodness, are led through collision with it into repentance. There is a saying that a good deal of crime is committed because of a lack of imagination. The man plans his crime, a murder perhaps, but cannot picture to himself beforehand what his feelings will be, and what the condition of things, in the moment after the crime is committed. One aspect of this is brought out by Browning in "Before" and "After."¹ The criminal sees all the natural elements in the situation; but what he fails to anticipate is the horror which follows the deed, as he comes into relation with the unexpected.

¹ "Dramatic Lyrics."

There is, however, a positive side also; the moral law is beneficent as well as stern. There is a certain satisfaction in the performance of duty, not a sense of pride—for who would feel pride because he had done something where failure to do it would have been meanness?—but a natural pleasure, rising sometimes to a holy joy, that one should have been the instrument in the accomplishment of good. A deep humility may accompany such approval of the conscience; but, as we have seen, the self-related feelings have their place in the highest life, and true love for others not only does not forbid, but implies, a certain degree of self-love.

CHAPTER XI

THE THEORIES OF A NATURAL BASIS FOR
THE MORAL LAW : UTILITARIANISM ; THE
THEORY OF DARWIN — THE BASIS OF THE
MORAL LAW FOUND IN THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNITY AS MANIFESTED IN THE SOCIAL OR-
DER — THE RELATION BETWEEN MORALITY
AND RELIGION

ATTEMPTS have been made to find a natural basis for the moral law. Of these the theory of utilitarianism is best known. A thing is right because some good is done in some way to oneself or to others. But suppose I recognize that an act of mine will bring harm to others, but good to me, why, in such a case, should I try to do good to others? This question the older, cruder utilitarianism did not answer. Mill recognized the difficulty, but did not attempt to meet it. Utilitarianism may furnish a measure for what is good ; it does not furnish the underlying impulse to

goodness. It assumes that right is that which is for the highest good of the world; "honesty is the best policy;" righteousness is determined by happiness. As a practical rule for conduct it is clumsy. Many moral judgments demand quick discernment. Instinctive obedience is needed. On shipboard everything is done for the success of the voyage; but the individual sailor obeys, not because he has this in mind, but because he is commanded. If we were always calculating the precise outcome of each act, we might do wrong or we might fail to do anything.

So far as the applicability of the theory is concerned, a great step in advance is taken when we come to Spencer's statement¹ that the moral sense is the result of the utilities of past generations, an inherited recognition of utility by which a man acts instinctively; utility is so repeatedly and constantly hammered into the nature that it becomes automatic. Of course, if we hold Weismann's²

¹ "Data of Ethics."

² August Weismann, "Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems."

view, that acquired characteristics cannot be inherited, this theory falls to the ground. In any case there are difficulties in the way of accepting it. If we ask how have the utilities been impressed, we are told "through civil law, through religious commandment, through parental instruction." This answer, however, is based in part on a misapprehension, for in the early forms of religion we find comparatively little account made of what we call morality. The people had *their* morality, that is, they had the manners and customs of their time; but this is not what we mean by morality. Perhaps, to avoid confusion, we had better use the term "altruistic virtue" instead of morality. It is morality in this sense which has so little place in the earlier forms of religion. What they made prominent was sacrifice, ritual, etc. Even in the thought of a future life, it was not his altruistic virtue while living which determined whether a man was to be happy or not after death, but the performance or non-performance of certain rites.

Besides the ritual in the lower forms of reli-

gion, we have the taboo, which has no moral significance, but which affected the individual without regard to his own wish and intention. Thus Œdipus becomes impure through taboo, though wholly innocent so far as his own moral and spiritual life is concerned.

No, obedience and order grew out of religious culture, submission also ; but not the moral sense, the impulse to righteousness. This existed before its recognition in religion and law, and during much of its growth moved in advance of them. Religion and morality develop from different centres at the outset. Only later, when at length religion can take a more comprehensive view, has it enjoined morality. Thus the explanation given by Spencer does not account for the moral law. The element of inheritance which he introduces into the theory of utilitarianism relieves it of its clumsiness by disposing of reflection and discussion, and contributing something of absoluteness and spontaneity. But the basis of the moral law is not reached. The cruder utilitarianism tells us neither what it is that prompts a man to do right, nor why it is that he feels

it his duty to do right. Spencer does give an answer to both questions, but it is not the final answer.

In trying to find a natural basis for the moral law, appeal has also been made to the theory of natural selection. In the "*Descent of Man*," Darwin, in his derivation of conscience,¹ finds the answer to the question, why conscience reproaches a man after a wrong deed, in the permanence of social instincts as compared with the intermittent character of selfish instincts. The self-regarding instincts prompt to the gratification of a particular need; personal grief or passion bears down and violates the social instincts; but when the passion has been satisfied, the social instincts again assert themselves, and in the calm which succeeds the man reproaches himself for having violated them. The social instincts have this advantage over the self-regarding instincts, that they have always the last word. Negatively considered, the social instincts have no authority beyond other instincts; they owe their authority simply to their greater perma-

¹ Vol. I, pp. 86, 87.

nence. They are not in themselves higher; they merely hold out longer.

But will this theory bear examination? Suppose we apply to it the logical method of difference. Are there any instincts which, though they have the last word, yet are not conscience? and does conscience sometimes speak when it does not have the last word? Take the case of a man whose supreme interest is money. A case of need is presented to him, and he gives a little more than he is in the habit of giving; the altruistic element, the social instinct, asserts itself exceptionally in his life. When he realizes what he has done, the selfish instincts reassert themselves and make their protest, and he reproaches himself for what he considers his folly. Such self-reproach as this is very different from the self-reproach which follows a wrong act. On the other hand, does the reproach of conscience come in cases where it is not given the last word? Certainly. The king in "Hamlet" is an example of what we often experience. I find myself tempted and my moral sense protests; I recognize its dignity even though I disobey.

The king in "Hamlet" feels that he has done wrong; he tries to pray for forgiveness, but cannot,

"Though inclination be as sharp as will:
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent;
And, like a man to double business bound,
I stand in pause where I shall first begin,
And both neglect." — Act iii, Scene 3.

At first thought Darwin's theory is plausible; but evidently the reproach of conscience arises from something more than the greater permanence of the social instincts.

In our examination of the earlier utilitarianism and of Spencer's theory of the moral instinct as the result of inheritance, we have seen that there are two questions with which we have to do: first, why people perform altruistic acts at all; and second, why they think it their duty to perform them. If we consider first the nature of the impulse to altruistic acts, we find that these acts are of two kinds, those which are directly and those which are indirectly altruistic. The directly altruistic are performed with the conscious purpose of helping others; we should not perform them if we

did not believe that what we are doing is to benefit some one else. The acts of indirect altruism are those in which the effect is not considered. For example, why does a man pay a debt? It is not because the other needs the money; the creditor may be rich, and he may even have forgotten about the debt. Yet an honorable man will pay every debt. He pays on his own account, for his own sake. Or take the case of a man who is returning home from abroad and has to make a declaration to the customs officers in regard to what he is bringing with him. An honorable man will make a true statement. The government may be actually suffering because of the surplus in its revenue; you may believe in free trade; but you give a fair, honest account of your goods. It is because you have respect for your own word. When a man fails to meet these obligations, his feeling at bottom, if he has any self-respect, is one of shame; the positive side of this feeling of shame we may call honor.¹

Thus we have two ethical principles. One

¹ C. C. Everett, "Poetry, Comedy, and Duty," III, "The Ultimate Facts of Ethics."

we call direct altruism; the other is indirect altruism, or honor. Acts done from the direct altruistic impulse have conscious reference to others; those done from a sense of honor have reference to one's self. In other words, altruism or sympathy is a principle of self-surrender, honor is one of self-assertion. Now, there are many kinds of self and consequently many kinds of honor. There is the personal honor of the kind which resents insult, the kind which may resort to duelling. Here there is no ethical value, except as this sort of self is the only self which the man has; then, of course, from his point of view it is right for him to defend it. The next higher self is found where a man regards himself as a member of a group. Here we have family honor and patriotism. The circle of his relation to others continues to enlarge, and he is jealous not only for his family or his country but for all men. Beginning with mere individualism, he has passed on to a larger self, in which he recognizes that he is a member of the race. As such he resents for others what at first he only resented for himself,

and he is ashamed to allow in himself what he would object to in another. No one may know of his wrong act; but he is ashamed to be a rotten timber in the general fabric of society. He will not separate himself from his kind by doing what he condemns in others. He arrives at this recognition of the moral law, sometimes as he blames himself, and then applies the same blame to others, and again when he blames another first, and then applies the same blame to himself.

We come next to the sense of obligation. In resting the moral sense on the social relations, it may seem that I have given to the moral law a superficial basis. But this is so only as we consider the social relations superficially. Take the principle of love. This is more than the sense of duty. Duty is a sense of obligation to do something which if we are filled with love we do naturally. The man who provides for his family from either a sense of honor or a sense of duty has not reached the level of the man who cares for his family because he loves them. Love, we say, is the basis of the law and the fulfilling

of the law. Now love is the most mysterious thing in the world. In it the individual passes out from himself and centres his life in another.

Psychologists do not always do full justice to the altruistic feelings. Spencer, for example, finds the basis of altruism in sympathy, which he describes only in its lowest form as an imitative feeling. Thus, if we see a person uncomfortable, we feel uncomfortable too; if another yawns, we yawn; in seeing another's pain, we have a feeling of imitative pain. But this sort of sympathy is centred wholly in the individual himself. In altruistic sympathy our pain is not imitative; instead, we are profoundly moved by the fact that another person is suffering; the feeling of sorrow enters. Further, the effects of the two kinds of sympathy are wholly different. Imitative sympathy, self-regarding sympathy, may cause anger, the anger in such a case arising from our sense of discomfort. Frances Power Cobbe tells a story of two children, one of whom fell out of bed and hurt himself and cried; the other child flies at the first and

beats him: the second child is unhappy, and punishes the first child, because of the trouble he has caused. We may also make the effort to forget what disturbs us, to shut our eyes to it. In "Bleak House" Dickens makes Skimpole run away from the child sick with smallpox because the delicacy of his nature makes it impossible for him to endure suffering; Dame Durden has little feeling, and can stay with the child and see the suffering and give the needed care.

Unselfish sympathy seeks to help and relieve the sufferer. To forget suffering is the easier course. The more one accustoms himself to disregard the troubles of others, the easier it becomes, whereas the more we try to relieve suffering the more suffering oppresses us. The pain of sympathy can never be removed by the effort to relieve the suffering which causes it; the undertaking is too great. The wonderful thing is that through love we thus break through all individual preferences, and instead of following the easier course, choose that which involves effort and sacrifice. What is the significance of this?

To find our answer we must turn back to the first idea of the reason. As the law of causation was found to be, not the mere sequence of events, but an inner connection between cause and effect, revealing a unity which underlies all experience; as in the inflexible working of the law of contradictions we feel the grasp of this principle of unity so far as all thought is concerned — so the principle of obligation, the principle of the moral law, is found to rest in the love and sympathy which manifest the same great unity in society. The sympathy which summons us out of selfishness is not a mere imitative, echoing reflection; it is the suffering of a man, not because of another, but in and for another. The whole social basis of morality looked at from the outside seems superficial; but examined from within, nothing can be more profound. Unselfish, helpful sorrow represents the positive side of this principle, the reproach of conscience the negative side. The man who takes advantage of another sets himself off apart from others; this contradicts the principle of unity, and he feels himself

solitary. On the other hand, to the extent to which a man's love embraces others, he is one with them. The only solitude is that which a man makes for himself. When love and sympathy are checked, or cease, then follows solitude—a solitude that is often haunted.

Why do not all feel this relation, just as a stone feels the attraction of gravitation? No one does fully escape. The criminal cannot wholly shut himself off. We are all bound by the principle, though the consciousness of it is less in some than in others. But man may choose to live his life more profoundly or more superficially, as the stone cannot; man has a certain freedom.

If the principle of the moral law rests upon altruism, then all the various forms of morality have a common source; the forms may be very different, and at the same time the heart remain the same. There is no system of commandments, the only law is the law of love. The Fiji islander believes that the bodily state in which one dies will be that in which he enters upon the life after death, and there-

fore he puts his parents to death while they are in full health of body and mind; from his point of view this is an act of love. Love has to learn from experience what acts are helpful and what are injurious to others; and where experience cannot reach, the result is helped out by theories and beliefs. Public sentiment comes to the aid of the altruistic virtues, religion assists them, law more or less. Yet they have also a certain spontaneousness.

The moral law finds its basis in the principle of unity. It is thus supernatural because the principle of unity is supernatural. It breaks in upon the natural world, the "noumenon," to use Kant's phrase, "breaking in upon the world of phenomena." Spencer, in a remarkable passage,¹ recognizes this supernatural quality of the moral law. "If the principles of morality," he says, "are those toward which the unknowable is aiming, then morality has the sanction of the unknowable."

As regards the relation between the moral law and religion, we have already seen that to a great extent the development of the

¹ "Data of Ethics," p. 171.

higher ethics has taken place independently of religion. As in the human embryo the various growths are from different centres, yet as development continues these growths unite, so religion and morality appear to have their rise from different centres and to unite only at length in their highest aspect to form one inseparable whole. When the God who is the object of worship comes to be known as the Absolute Goodness, then religion adopts as its own the higher ethics and gives it its sanction.

What, then, is the gain to morality from its relation to religion? We have seen that in its highest aspect the moral law is a manifestation of the unity of the social order. This unity first shows itself without conscious recognition on the part of the individual; he feels it as a power long before he recognizes it for what it really is. Now, as soon as religion and morality come together this principle is illuminated. God has "made of one blood all nations of men."¹ It is no longer a vague, abstract principle of unity in which

¹ Acts xvii. 26.

we stand together; we are in the grasp of God. When we define in this way the principle of brotherhood, we are defining, not only our relation to our fellows, but also our relation to God.

In the second place, the sense of the supernatural aspect of the moral law is deepened. When we do right, we feel that the power of Omnipotence is behind us and working in and through us. Further, we are freed to a large extent from the pressure of little things. Religion gives to morality a broader outlook. The little child thinks life a failure because it is denied some pleasure on which it has set its heart; the man knows that the days and the years will bring their opportunity. So religion, the relation toward God, leads the soul out into infinite fields of spiritual being, and the petty influences by which we are surrounded no longer distract and hinder us. In the general conduct of life the thought of eternal rewards and punishments has much less effect on men than is often supposed. It plays a large part, it is true, before the moral law comes to be

known in its higher aspects. But as the ethical ideal rises, the importance of rewards and punishments diminishes; the individual recognizes the impossibility of fulfilling absolutely the whole of the moral law. Only the unusual, the startling, act excites the dread of supernatural penalty; for the ordinary occasions of life, moral standards adapt themselves to the individual and the community; the question is, "How far?" Yet a belief in God and immortality, in so far as it makes a man take a larger view of life, does have a great effect upon moral character.

We often speak slightly of what is known as death-bed repentance, and assume that the murderer, for example, who dies on the scaffold expressing repentance for his crime is necessarily a hypocrite. Yet there is no reason why such repentance should not be real. The man is taken out of the temptations and all the usual relations to which he has been accustomed; he can see good and evil without bias; he can see where he has done wrong. At such a time a man's life is

like the compass that has been lifted to the masthead, above any interference from surrounding influences. His better instincts follow the leading of their own nature. Of course, if the compass is brought down to the deck again, it will vary as before, and if the man who has been at the point of death is allowed to live and comes back into the accustomed relations, it does not argue his repentance untrue that old attractions and temptations may again assert their hold upon him. Religion aims to reach permanently a result similar to that which in such crises is gained transiently; it seeks to introduce men into a larger life where immediate influences shall have less power, and the higher instincts shall be free to follow their own law. Suppose a civilized man shipwrecked upon an island inhabited only by savages; so long as he has any hope of a return to civilization, it is easier for him to maintain the old habits of life; but when once he despairs of rescue he sinks to the level of those about him. Thus religion makes possible an outlook beyond the world of sense,

so that it shall not fill and obstruct the horizon; religion does not necessarily dwarf the ordinary relations of life, but it puts the higher relations in a stronger light, so that naturally they assert a greater authority.

On the whole, religion and morality gain each from the other. Each may make the other clearer and stronger. Each contributes its force to the other, and the two work together as a single force. Some are awakened to any real religious sense only by the power of conscience. The man finds a supernatural power present with him in the moral law which he has in his own heart; or as he breaks the moral law and the voice of conscience cries to him, he recognizes the presence of God as a resistance made to his own independent activity. Thus in one way or the other he realizes that there is in religion something more than its formal or material aspects. On the other hand, as we have seen, religion reënforces and illuminates the moral sense. It is more difficult for the individual to live selfishly, to shut himself off from the common life, the unity of the world, when

once he has recognized this unity under the form of a great spiritual presence and power.

The question is often asked, What would become of morality if men should lose their faith in religion? So far as communities are concerned, history shows that morality and religion usually rise or fall together; as religion is denied, the moral standard falls, there is a greater prevalence of crime, a greater general laxity. This does not mean that the decline of religion is necessarily the cause of the decline of morality; both may be the result of a general decline in life. It is important to notice, however, that the same principle does not in general hold true of individuals. The individual partakes of the spirit in which he is trained, the influence of habit is about him, and thus we have examples of a high degree of ethical development among men and women who have given up positive religion.

The decline of religion would not all at once draw after it the full train of its consequences. The potter's wheel continues to revolve long after the vessel which was moulded upon it has

been finished and removed, and established habits have a momentum by which they still endure for a time. Certainly we could not be sure what the result would be so long as the strife between religion and non-religion was in progress. Many scientific men who reject positive religion take pleasure, nevertheless, in writing about religion. Huxley was apparently never so happy as when he was discussing religious questions. A person who faces these great questions, even when the view which he takes of them is negative, still has his life enlarged by them ; he is brought into touch with high ideals and wide outlooks. It is as though we were intent on building a high wall about an island to shut out the sight of the sea ; we should have to wait for a time before we could know what the effect was to be : so long as the wall was in process of building, those who were at work upon it would have the outlook. So the critics of religion look out on great possibilities, however strongly they deny their reality. Imagine a Huxley with no thought or idea of religion, and contrast him with the real Huxley, inter-

ested in controverting positive religious ideas, and what a different man we should have !

Whether a decline of both religion and morality at once is caused by the lessening power of religion, or whether the lessening power of religion and of morality results from the lowering of the tone of the general life of the community, it is hard to say. Although morality is not dependent upon religion, yet to do away with religion might bring about a reaction stronger than the positive influence. Religion gives to morality an immense power.

CHAPTER XII

THE SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF BEAUTY — THE RELATION BETWEEN BEAUTY AND RELIGION — THE THIRD DEFINITION OF RELIGION

WE come now to the consideration of the third idea of the reason, beauty.¹ We have to ask whether this too is supernatural, and what relation, if any, it sustains to religion. There are a great many theories about beauty. The fact appears to be that if we divide the external world into certain types of form, the objects which manifest any one of these types freely and purely arouse in us the sense of beauty or of sublimity. If we begin with the material world, we find this true ; the objects of the material world fill us with the sense of beauty when they are perfectly presented. In the same way sounds and colors charm us when

¹ C. C. Everett, "Poetry, Comedy, and Duty," I ;
"Science of Thought," pp. 153, 221.

pure. There must be harmony of sound and harmony of color if we are to know color and sound as they really are. In mere noises sound is broken up by the accident of the instrument or the environment, and does not reach us in its ideal form. When, as in music, accident is done away with, sound is left free to follow its own laws. We may even say that noise is not sound, because sound in noise is not itself. It is the same, again, when we pass to animal life. That living thing is most beautiful which most freely and purely manifests itself. It is thus that the human form when perfectly developed is so beautiful beyond other forms ; man stands by vital power, and we see manifested in him the unity of life, its absolute balance. Finally, if we take a step higher, into the spiritual world, we find there, too, beauty of spirit wherever the spiritual life is perfectly exhibited.

There is a seeming contradiction to this in the beauty of the imperfect. A ruin may be more beautiful than was the complete building. But this is because the ruin has been taken back into the heart of nature. Whereas

the complete building, however much we may have enjoyed the beauty which belonged to it, stood out apart by itself, in the ruin nature has made itself again supreme. In the same way the Chinese junk appeals more strongly to the sense of beauty than the modern steamer, because the junk is subordinate to the sea, while the steamer dominates it. The beauty of the perfection of the type does not exclude a beauty of imperfection wherever that imperfection appears in relation to other elements. For the world itself is beautiful. Wherever we find the elements of nature and of life presented in a typical form, the sense of beauty is aroused. It is not an external sense ; it is bound up with our whole relation with the world. There is in the world a unity by which all the elements are brought into relation with one another, and between the world and us there is something in common by which the world, as it were, speaks to us. The sense of beauty is not a feeling attendant upon the intellectual recognition of the type realized ; it is the sense of companionship with the outer world, the sympathetic enjoy-

ment of its perfection. The interpreters of beauty are the poets. No treatise on beauty can surpass Emerson's Ode.¹ Take these lines from the second strophe :

“ Is it that my opulent soul
Was mingled from the generous whole;
Sea-valleys and the deep of skies
Furnished several supplies;
And the sands whereof I'm made
Draw me to them, self-betrayed? ”

Here the supernatural character of beauty is given recognition, the unity in nature and between nature and the human soul.

Just as morality is the power of unity binding individual souls into a whole in the social order, so beauty is the manifestation of the principle by which our lives and the surrounding world are taken up into a common relationship. The beauty of a single flower is an indication of the beauty of the whole. If the sense of beauty is the recognition of companionship between ourselves and the external world, then every beautiful object implies it. There is the scientific approach to

¹ R. W. Emerson, “ Ode to Beauty. ”

the thought of unity, such as Tennyson gives us in the "Flower in the Crannied Wall"; if we could perfectly understand the flower, we should understand and know all things. And there is the approach from the æsthetic side, which we have in Emerson's "Ode to Beauty," and by which, in every beautiful thing,

"The frailest leaf, the mossy bark,
The acorn's cup, the raindrop's arc,
The swinging spider's silver line,
The ruby of the drop of wine,"

is found the implication of the whole.

The three ideas of the reason are simply different manifestations of one and the same principle. The first affirms that which is, the second that which ought to be, while in the third we find that which is as it ought to be, the fulfilled perfection. Recognition of the moral law appeals to the conscious spirit. The spirit which is wholly beautiful is as it ought to be spontaneously without consciousness of the ought; it performs this or that act because it is the most natural and desirable thing in the world. The beautiful is not beautiful

unless it is free. It must be "its own excuse for being." So far as we think of an object as serviceable, to that extent it ceases to be beautiful. The enjoyment of beauty is pure contemplation, and the personal element must not enter.¹

It is often said that beauty is the mingling of variety and unity. This is in a sense true ; but mere variety and mere unity is not enough ; there must be the variety and unity of something. Beauty as a whole is thus the manifestation in the most concrete and varied forms of the unity of the universe.

What is the relation of beauty to religion? The two have been associated to a wide extent. In the primitive religions beauty may have little place ; the objects in which worship centres are those which attract by their oddity, their peculiar size or conformation, rather than by their beauty. But as soon as we leave these earliest forms behind, beauty begins to manifest itself in the object of worship. This emphasis upon beauty strengthens until, in Greece, religion becomes the worship of beauty.

¹ C. C. Everett, "Science of Thought," pp. 158, 159.

Besides being the object of worship, beauty enters as a means of worship; architecture and music and sculpture and painting, all have had their part.

Why is it that beauty has such prominence in religion? Because religion is the feeling toward the supernatural, and beauty is a manifestation of the supernatural in the world. As the moral law and religion, developing from different centres, at length come together, so also do beauty and religion, with this difference only, that beauty was earlier associated with religion than was the moral law. Negatively considered, beauty lifts us out of material associations; positively, it is one manifestation more of the reality of life.

Yet beauty may stand in opposition to religion. The religion of Greece did not lead the people to the highest things of life. Often the love of beauty invites to selfishness and sensuality. This happens first of all when the sense of beauty does not take us out of ourselves. It is a fundamental element in the enjoyment of beauty that it should consist in contemplation. Anything which interferes with contem-

plation in so far hinders the recognition of the object as beautiful. Thus, when a man looks at a beautiful picture with the desire to possess it, the desire of possession is foreign to the sense of beauty, and therefore the enjoyment of the beauty in the picture is impaired. Again, beauty may stand opposed to religion when the object does not take the beholder beyond itself. Every beautiful object is a single instance of the absolute beauty of which it is a part, and the true enjoyment of beauty requires that we should have some sense of this connection in virtue of which the object does not stand alone.

“ A primrose by the river’s brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.”¹

Why was it not something more? Because to him the primrose, beautiful in itself, suggested nothing beyond itself. The beauty of the flower must suggest the beauty of nature itself.

“ To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.”²

¹ William Wordsworth, “ Peter Bell,” stanza 12.

² Wordsworth, “ Intimations of Immortality,” stanza 11.
See also R. W. Emerson, “ Poems: ” “ Each and All.”

The beautiful object of any sort must open on one side or another into the infinite universe. Otherwise the object alone by itself may be pretty, but it must lack the beauty which comes only as there is some opening into the larger relation. In art what is called "complete enclosure" has always an unpleasant effect. The statue remains open on the side of color, the painting on the side of form. When we try to combine both, the form and the color, as in waxwork, the result disappoints us. The wax figure attempts to imitate life, and we know that it is not life.

The phrase, "looks through nature up to nature's God," has often been interpreted to mean that the contrivances of nature suggest a God as their designer. The more profound sense is that which I have indicated. It is not that in our appreciation of the beauty and wonder of nature we necessarily think of the wisdom and power of the Creator, but simply that we have the sense of the divine presence.

In the third place — and here we get at the heart of the matter — beauty may oppose religion whenever it is felt too soon or in excess.

The enjoyment of beauty is contemplation, but the religious life calls for action. A life of contemplation may by its very attraction and delight dull the active ethical tendencies, and so lead to inaction and the neglect of duty. But is not this fatal to any vital relation of beauty with religion? No. For worship, too, and even religious contemplation, may stand similarly in the way of real religion. Jesus recognizes this: "Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, . . . first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."¹ The temple service, when it takes the place of the practical duties of life, is out of place and in the way of the highest spiritual devotion and surrender. But as the mistaken use of worship does not imply that worship is in itself a hindrance to religion, so it is not to be assumed, because the sense of beauty is sometimes in conflict with religion, that there is therefore no real relation between beauty and religion. We cannot argue here from one

¹ Matt. v. 23, 24.

example to another. In Byron we find the love of beauty divorced from religion and ethics. With Wordsworth as great an appreciation of beauty was united with a profound religious sense.

No, religion without beauty is as imperfect as religion without the moral law. Not that the æsthetic element occupies a position of equal importance with the ethical element. In the perfect cathedral we say that foundation and spire are both necessary, but they are necessary in different senses. So in religion the ethical element is fundamental; the æsthetic element helps to complete it. In what way? Religion without the moral sense would be misleading, but religion has not this dependence upon the æsthetic sense. What, then, is the opportunity of beauty? To serve as inspiration. It must yield always to the moral law. The monk in his cell, rapt in a vision of the Virgin, is called away to give food to a beggar at the door. He hesitates, but goes. He returns to find the vision still before him, but, "Hadst thou not gone," the Virgin says, "I could not have stayed."

The moral law asserts its prior claim. But just as play is needed for rest and recreation, so beauty enters to refresh us. It fails if one tries to enjoy it from any sense of duty. The exercise which a man takes only for the sake of his health fails to give full refreshment; if he is to have the greatest benefit from it, he must play. The man who seeks happiness is not the one who finds it. So it is in the enjoyment of beauty. A man must hear music because he wants to, not because he thinks he ought.

The mediæval scholastics held that after the performance of all duties here the saint in glory should find his rest and joy in the contemplation of the divine beauty. Our enjoyment of beauty in the world, our delight in each most perfect manifestation of the universal life, this is the beginning of that "vision beatific."

The first definition of religion which we reached was that religion is essentially *feeling*.¹ To this we added in a second definition that

¹ Page 51.

it is feeling *toward the supernatural*.¹ Both of these definitions were inclusive, covering all forms of religion. We have arrived now at a definition which is no longer like the others, absolutely inclusive, but typical. RELIGION IS A FEELING TOWARD A SUPERNATURAL PRESENCE MANIFESTING ITSELF IN TRUTH, GOODNESS, AND BEAUTY. There remains for us to substitute for the word "supernatural" the word "spiritual," but this step would take us beyond the limits of our present examination.²

There are forms of religion which apparently have little to do with truth and goodness and beauty. Take, however, the lowest form of religion. Upon what does it rest? Upon the assumption that in the world there is something akin to the human spirit; the unity of spiritual power is the first type of unity which men recognize.³ In the first stage, it is true,

¹ Page 88.

² The definition of religion as thus finally modified was considered by Dr. Everett in the longer course of lectures, on "Theism and the Special Content of Christian Faith," to which this series served as an introduction.

³ Page 165.

the idea is only poorly developed ; there is no conscious conception of it, only the implicit assumption that the external world is controlled by the same force which man finds within himself, the assumption that there is a unity of the world akin to the unity within himself. This forms the basis of religious belief. It is that which alone entitles these lower forms of religion to be called religion. In the second stage of development the type of unity is taken from the material world, and the spiritual seems accidental. In the highest stages the spiritual unity becomes again the basis. The other principles, goodness and beauty, grow up slowly, developing more or less independently of religion ; then, as religion recognizes them, they are incorporated in it. There is nothing, therefore, which can properly be called religion which does not rest upon unity.

We have here to do only with the psychological elements of religious faith. Within these limits we recognize two distinct aspects of religion. Under the first aspect we have the form of religion, that which we have called the supernatural. Under the second aspect

we have the content of religion, the three ideas of the reason — truth and goodness and beauty. The form and the content may be separated. The form is found with very little content in savage religions, and throughout the various developments of religion the formal element can be recognized. It appears even in the highest stage ; even here, as we have already seen, religion may be for the individual worshipper self-related, and the supreme being conceived only as a power to which appeal is made, a power which serves the worshipper, a power which may even possess qualities opposed to truth and goodness and beauty. On the other hand, we may find devotion to the content without recognition of the form. A man may follow the leading of truth and goodness and beauty without recognition of the supernatural, of God, just as he may recognize God, and give to truth and goodness and beauty no recognition.

Which of these two kinds of men can be said to worship God in the truer sense? If we must choose, we should say that the man who recognizes the content worships God in

the truer sense. It is as though we should take some one to a gallery and show him there a poor picture said to have been painted by Raphael, and he should see also another painting, very beautiful, not painted by Raphael; "I do not care for Raphael," he says, "the second picture is far more beautiful." Another man may admire the poorer painting. Which would really honor Raphael? We must believe that Raphael himself would have thought little of the man who praised his name but dishonored his work. So in religion, the man who worships truth and goodness and beauty worships what God is. The other recognizes the name of God, but neglects that which gives meaning to the name. Of course the highest form of religion is that in which the two aspects are united. Such union gives power to all the elements. Unity becomes clear, goodness receives impulse, beauty is manifested in a higher form.

The whole history of religion is found in the attempt to fill the form with the content. How does the development take place? There is a twofold movement. It is often said that

men construct their divinities according to the ideal of their own lives, so that as man develops his gods develop with him. Man transfers his own goodness to the divinity, and then the divinity in turn reacts upon him, and the goodness of the divinity stimulates the goodness of the man. We can even see the political ideas of men thus reflected in their divinities.

This is partly true. There are, however, other elements which interfere with the working of this principle. In the first place, in the earliest forms of religion, the conception of the gods grew out of the phenomena of nature, and was affected by the working of those phenomena. It is said that we judge others by ourselves, and this is true. Yet the mildest man knows what anger is, and when a man's life is interfered with he does not need to be cruel himself in order to feel that the gods are cruel toward him. He forms his conception of the divine power from the influence which it has upon his life.

Again, very few develop their religion for themselves. They take that which comes to them. They may inherit their religion from

the past, or they may receive it from some one who has religious power and insight, and impresses his power upon others. In either case we find as a result religious conceptions which are misfits, because made for somebody else. There have always been, on the one hand, men who were in advance of the religion which they professed, so far as their own lives were concerned; and, on the other hand, similarly, those whose lives were as far below the religious standard of their time. At the present day, we recognize Christianity as the highest type of religion, but in the religion which we actually live how far we fall short of the ideal in which we believe!

At any given period there may be two kinds of religion present, entirely unreconciled. In the Greek religion recognition of the divinities of the middle heaven mingled with lofty visions of something beyond and over them. In Christianity the religious man may recognize a God who is perfect love and justice at the same time that his theology represents a God whose justice and love are partial. When the religion which men inherit comes into con-

flict with some higher perception of their own, some are torn by perplexity; others are not conscious of the conflict; others yet trust in a final reconciliation. We are all to some extent in this last position. How, we ask, can we reconcile the evil of the world with the goodness and justice and love of God?

It is impossible, then, to apply rigidly to actual experience the theory that men create their gods according to their own nature. Religion is conservative. Men cling to that which comes to them hallowed by the past. They fear lest they may not think and act as they should toward the mysterious presence which they worship. Yet, in spite of contradictions, as we look at the development of religion as a whole, we find that religion has advanced as man himself has developed.

The ideal religion, the one perfect religion, would be that in which the presence of the Absolute Spirit should be fully recognized, and the ideas of the reason—truth, goodness, and beauty—acknowledged as the content of this Absolute Spirit. The various religions of the world suggest and approach the ideal

religion, each to a greater or less degree. The ideal religion is like the pure air of the upper heaven as compared with the atmosphere of the earth. The lower atmosphere is everywhere different; it is vitiated by mists and dust and smoke and all the various earthly elements; yet we breathe it, and find in it, with all its impurity, life and strength and refreshment. The purer air is better, and so is the ideal religion. Yet in most forms of religion enough of the ideal is found to give men spiritual thought and some degree of spiritual life.

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